In the Middle East, Separatists Are the New Spoilers

Ariel I. Ahram

There is an end in sight for the wars that wracked the Middle East for much of the decade, even as the fighting drags on. The U.S., Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other outside powers have found a general formula for conflict resolution that combines state-building with power-sharing. Central states would be empowered to defeat terrorists and take control over otherwise ungoverned territory while former belligerents would be enticed into the fold of the state. This two-pronged formula, however, is ill-suited for dealing with separatists that seek to carve out states of their own with new international boundaries. Separatist forces played a critical role in sustaining local orders as national politics descended into chaos after 2011. They appealed to the global community to grant them self-determination. Inhabiting far-off border regions where state control was minimal, they were foot soldiers in the coalitions that defeated ISIS and other radical Islamist terrorists. But separatists’ demands for recognition of national rights are typically ignored in peace processes that remain focused on elites inhabiting state capitals. Separatists are thus poised to be the region’s next spoilers, wrecking efforts that seek peace and stability through the rehabilitation of existing states.

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Where Arab Separatists Come From

The boundaries of Arab states are famously misshapen, too small for the liking of Arab nationalists and pan-Islamist ideologues and too big to accommodate the national aspirations of stateless Kurds, Berbers, and Palestinians. This mismatch between national identity and state borders hindered the effectiveness and responsiveness of political institutions. States became, in the words of the 2009 Arab Human Development report, “a menace to human security, rather than its chief supporter.” Yet through much of the twentieth century, the global
Borders, Migration, and the Nation

*From the Associate Director*

It is once again my pleasure to welcome you to this year’s edition of Democracy & Society. This year’s edition is the result of hard work by Editor-in-Chief Avram Reisman, Assistant Editor Matison Hearn-Desautels, and former Assistant Editor Han Wool Jung. Our newest Assistant Editor, William Condon, joined the team shortly before publication and helped to get the issue over the finish line.

2018-2019 was a busy academic year for the Democracy & Governance program. We welcomed our 13th incoming class with eight new students joining our ranks. The cohort continues our tradition of bringing together students with a diversity of experiences and backgrounds. Our new students join us from careers in non-governmental organizations, diplomacy, and the armed forces, as well as several who came to our program directly from their undergraduate studies. They have lived and/or worked around the world, including South Korea, China, Morocco, Cameroon, Egypt, Taiwan, and Kuwait (to name just a few).

At the opposite end of their M.A. studies, we bid farewell to nine graduating students. They leave us for careers in public, private, and non-profit positions both in the United States and overseas. We wish them the best of luck as they take all that they’ve learned here on the Hilltop and continue the important work of supporting democracy and good governance around the world.

This was also a year of innovation for the Democracy & Governance program. We introduced two new programs. One, entitled “In Your Shoes” was a partnership between Georgetown University and Patrick Henry College. The program provided students from both campuses with an opportunity to explore similarities and differences in their lives through the medium of theatrical performance. This provided an opportunity for the DG program and our partners to support some of the most basic work of democracy building here in our own back yard.

In June, we launched our first-ever study-abroad program. As part of a new summer course, our Director Daniel Brumberg led students on a 10-day study trip to Tunisia. There, students were able to hear from leaders in government, business, civil society, and academia about the on-the-ground challenges of democratic consolidation. You can read more about this and other program news in the Program Highlights section at the back of this issue.

This issue of Democracy & Society takes up the timely issues of borders and identity, and what they mean for democracy and (especially) stable governance today. Under the theme of “Borders, Migration, the Nation,” the contributions in this issue all grapple with questions of boundaries, whether they be physical or conceptual. The articles that follow span geographic regions and particular focus, but all are rooted in this same question: what are the causes and effects of dividing people and polities?

The issue opens with an insightful contribution from Ariel Ahram, Associate Professor at Virginia Tech’s School of Public and International Affairs. Ahram is a specialist in Middle Eastern politics and security and has written extensively on questions of governance, authoritarianism, and stability. Drawing on his recent book Break All the Borders: Separatism and the Reshaping of the Middle East, Ahram argues that separatists—those looking to build new borders—are likely to be a key force undermining Middle Eastern stability for the foreseeable future.

Questions of security then take us to China, where Chohan Hsiung explores the roots of Uyghur nationalism and the increasingly brutal response of the Chinese government. He highlights the way that economic changes have transformed a cultural conflict into one more complex, but concludes on a hopeful note for the future.

Insecurity and government abuse also play a prominent role in Anderson Gómez, Lina Hernández, and Roddy Enrique Rodríguez’s article on the Venezuelan crisis. Together, these authors examine the refugee crisis sparked by Venezuela’s economic collapse and identify four challenges that must be addressed in managing the situation. Throughout their analysis, the authors emphasize the importance of both domestic and regional actors and propose concrete steps for successfully resolving the crisis.

Shifting the focus to Europe, Berta Zabaleta Caton takes up the question of people moving across borders in a very different context: the ramifications of Brexit for migration to the United Kingdom. Caton examines the costs and benefits of low-skilled workers migrating to the United Kingdom and concludes that it is hardly in the interests of the UK government to cut off the free movement of people. Acknowledging the political costs, Caton argues that this aspect of the Leave campaign ought to be abandoned in favor a more pragmatic deal between the United Kingdom and European Union.

Aylaí Dominguez explores the day-to-day choices brought about by immigration from the perspective of the migrant, rather than the state. In her contribution, she analyzes the decisions over healthcare that become increasingly complex for immigrants. Dominguez concludes that
immigration and the recreation of various kinds of borders affect health outcomes in immigrants, stripping them of some types of agency and supporting parallel systems of care.

Finally, a book review by Drake Long reviews Jasmin Mujanovic’s book *Hunger and Fury: The Crisis of Democracy in the Balkans* (Oxford University Press, 2018). Long applauds the fresh perspective Mujanovic brings to the subject and finds much to appreciate and highlight, even as he offers context and identifies several important questions raised by the book.

Taken together, the pieces in this issue offer the reader a variety of perspectives on this year’s theme. From repression to refugees and from insurgents to institutions, we hope that you find much to consider. Questions of national identity, the strength or porousness of borders, and the impact of human migration are not going anywhere anytime soon. We believe these contributions further those conversations and we hope you enjoy the issue.

As always, you can keep up to date with the latest events and debates related to democracy and governance by following our blog, Democracy & Society Online, at www.democracyandsociety.net. You can also learn more about the Democracy & Governance M.A. program at http://government.georgetown.edu/democracy-and-governance.

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AHRAM, Continued from Page 1

community insisted that international borders remain fixed. Wary of threats to their territorial integrity, incumbent states tended to shun separatist movements, lest secession lead to a slippery slope. Political contestation in the Middle East, therefore, typically did not challenge the existence of states, but rather focused on who would rule them. Consequently, even the most artificial states (and their borders) tended to endure.³

The collapse of Arab regional order during the 2011 uprisings provided a chance to reconsider the shape of states. The main opposition protests still sought control over the central government, but separatists took advantage of the breakdown of security services to set up their own enclaves of self-rule. Beside ISIS, the most notorious breaker of borders, movements on the periphery of Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Libya added to the centrifugal pressure. These groups campaigned to revive national liberation movements that had been denied or defeated in the previous century. Separatists competed with other rebel factions to offer alternative modes of governance. They ran oil installations, adjudicated tribal disputes, and allocated access to irrigation. Rebel rule was messy and sometimes ugly, but often “good enough”⁴ to protect civilians in the midst of brutal war. The separatists’ diplomatic strategy combined pragmatism and moral suasion. On one hand, they joined the global campaign against radical Islamist factions, particularly ISIS. On the other hand, they asked the international community to rectify past mistakes by granting them states of their own.

The Kurds, the largest stateless minority in the region, are an obvious example of separatists who gained ground during the crisis. Repeated efforts to establish a Kurdish nation-state ended in brutal repression. After the 1990-91 Gulf War, Kurdish guerrillas expelled Saddam Hussein’s forces from northern Iraq. Under the umbrella of the U.S’s no-fly zone, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Popular Union of Kurdistan (PUK) ran the self-proclaimed Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) as an effective de facto state. The 2005 Iraqi constitution granted the KRG broad autonomy, including legalizing the Kurdish security forces, called Peshmerga. KDP and PUK leaders integrated into the Iraqi state while delicately pushing for Kurdish nationalist interest.⁴ Tensions remained between Erbil and Baghdad about oil and the disposition of disputed territories like Kirkuk. KRG leaders grew bolder as popular protests and the ISIS insurgency paralyzed the central government. When IS overran Mosul in 2014, KRG forces moved into Kirkuk, Nineveh, Diyala, and southern Erbil provinces. KRG President Massoud Barzani spoke about correcting Iraq’s faulty colonial boundaries. The U.S. increased its military support to the KRG, both to combat ISIS and to offset Iraq’s growing reliance on Iranian-trained militias.

Syrian Kurds’ separatist campaign emerged from less propitious beginnings. Successive governments in Damascus sought to make Syria a unitary, centralized, and Arab-dominated state. A short-lived Kurdish autonomous zone in the far northeast was aborted in the 1930s.³ Kurds saw their lands expropriated, their language restricted, and, in some cases, their citizenship revoked. When anti-regime protests began, Syrian Kurdish parties splintered. The Democratic Union Party (PYD), probably the most important single faction in the Kurdish space, declared its loyalty to the Assad regime. At the same time, the PYD launched its own plan for territorial autonomy, claiming the territory along the north and northeastern border that the Syrian army abandoned as part of Rojava (Western Kurdistan). With ideological and operational ties to the Turkish PKK, the PYD touted its quasi-Marxist, secular, and pluralistic creed. PYD cadres administered security, justice, and education in self-proclaimed cantons. The quickly neutralized opposition within their areas of control, including other Kurdish factions. PYD militias were crucial in the campaign against ISIS in Raqqa. Further distancing itself from Assad, the PYD forces became the mainstay of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).⁶

The leaders of the Southern Resistance (SR) in Yemen, a loose coalition of politicians, insurgents, tribal leaders, and Islamists, similarly tried to make themselves indispensable to foreign sponsors. The SR traces its origins to the merger
of North Yemen and the southern People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in 1990. After unification, there were almost immediate complaints about corruption and political marginalization in the south. In 1994, a brief but bloody civil war led to the purge of much of the old PDRY elite. Promised political reform and devolution went unimplemented. Southerners increasingly talked of northern “colonization” and “occupation.” Although overshadowed by the Houthi war in the far north and the anti-terrorist campaign against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), by the mid-2000s the southern insurgency was probably the most violent of Yemen's multiple wars.7

The southern separatists seized military bases and other installations in the midst of Yemen's protracted and blood regime transition. When Houthi forces, aligned with ousted President Ali Abudalleh Saleh, marched into Sana’a and drove the internationally-recognized government of Abdrabah Mansur Hadi into exile in 2014, the SR came into its own. Southern separatist factions took over sea and airports, utilities, hospitals, and oil facilities. Though they pledged allegiance to the Hadi government, they operated almost wholly independently. The UAE supported the formation of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), headed by Aidarous Zubaydi, a former PDRY military officer, and the Security Belt militia, headed by the Salafi preacher Hani Ben Bryk. The STC and other UAE-backed militias fought both against the Houthi invasion from the north and infiltration from AQAP and ISIS. Human rights organization documented major abuses at detention centers run jointly by the UAE and the Security Belt forces.8 In 2017, Hadi accused the STC of violating Yemen's sovereignty and moved to dismiss them from Aden, the provisional capital. The STC called Hadi’s bluff. Zubaydi declared the south’s independence amidst massive public demonstrations in Aden. Although Saudi Arabia rejected secession, actually dislodging the separatists proved impossible.

The separatist movement in Libya emerged in eastern Libya (Cyrenaica), which had been the epicenter of the initial February 2011 revolt against Qaddafi. The initial revolution had no discernible regional agenda. Cyrenaican tribes formed self-defense forces and aligned with the rebel government. But as the revolutionary front shifted to Tripolitania, many easterners feared being overshadowed by the more populous and prosperous western neighbors. The Emirate of Cyrenaica, they pointed out, had voluntarily federated into the United Kingdom of Libya in 1951 and the original constitution assured Cyrenaica its own army, legislature, and mineral wealth. Now the separatists moved to restore this autonomy by force of deed.9 Although separatists adopted the moniker of federalism, no division of power with the central government met their demands. Undergirding this political movement was a new quasi-racial political identity stressing the differences between indigenous Cyrenaicans from other Libyans. In Benghazi, separatist militias sparred with Islamist factions supported by elites from Misrata and Tripoli, as well as with radical jihadist tied to al-Qaeda. In the Gulf of Sirte, separatists tried to blackmail the central government through seizure of export oil terminals. The separatists backed with the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) during Libya's second civil war in 2014 and opposed the government in Tripoli. This also led to an alliance of convenience with General Khalifa Haftar, who was waging his own war against Tripoli. Separatists fought alongside Haftar’s self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA), helping to expel ISIS, al-Qaeda, and other Islamists factions from Cyrenaica. Still, there was a significant gap between Haftar’s plan to install a military government for the whole of Libya and the separatist ambition to root-out Tripoli and Misrata’s influence in the east.

Spoiler Alerts

Even at the height of civil wars in the Middle East, the international community treated its separatist allies warily. Pronouncement at the UN ritualistically affirmed commitments to unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. As long as the main axis of conflict hinged over who would rule the capital, the question of what to do with the separatists could be deferred. But as wars unwind and the international community tries to help states reconsolidate power, the separatists have become more insistent, making their status acute and obstructive.

With Kurdish Peshmerga serving at the front against ISIS, Barzani became more adamant about holding a referendum on secession. After fighting and dying to combat the jihadist scourge, the international community owed the Kurds a chance at self-determination. Baghdad deemed the referendum illegal. Some Kurds saw the referendum as a ploy to divert attention from the ruling elites corruption and apparent thuggery. Turkey and Iran, two of the KRG’s closest regional allies, cautioned against the move. The U.S., too, stuck to its “one Iraq” policy. Nevertheless, the referendum went forward in September 2017. The official results, unsurprisingly, indicated overwhelming support for independence, although enthusiasm was considerably lesser in areas outside of traditional KDP strongholds.10 Baghdad responded by dispatching troops to Kirkuk and the disputed territories while Iran and Turkey imposed an air and land blockade. The Kurdish leadership fractured, with the PUK preemptively withdrawing their forces. The
KDP, too, stood down after a few days of fighting. On Kurdish television, Barzani blamed the loss on the international community’s “betrayal” and the perfidy of his domestic adversaries. Although temporarily chastened, Kurdish nationalist demands remain trenchant and tensions with the central government high.

In Syria, the PYD’s Rojava hangs even more precariously. Under the auspices of the Astana Peace Process, Iran, Russia, and Turkey have empowered the Assad regime to reconsolidate territorial control. Idlib stands as the last rebel holdout. Turkey, which has long regarded the PYD as an extension of PKK, has become increasingly aggressive. In winter 2018, the Turkish army and allied Arab and Turkmen militias liquidated the Kurdish enclave in Afrin. The U.S. helped evacuate the PYD remnants to the remaining Rojava canton in the far northeast. However, President Trump’s announcement that the US would withdraw from Syria left the remnants of Rojava completely exposed. Turkey vociferously opposed any residual U.S. commitment to the Syrian Kurds. The PYD were forced to turn to Assad and Russia for support. The Kurd’s status within Syria’s pending constitutional negotiations is uncertain, but the prospects for renewed violence in Rojava is considerable.

In Libya, nearly continual fighting against Islamists groups in Benghazi, Derna, and the Gulf of Sirte exhausted the separatist militias between 2014 and 2017. Haftar evinces little sympathy for the separatist agenda and has set out to replace his erstwhile allies with the more professional, better equipped, and loyal LNA. Military and financial support from the UAE, Egypt, and Russia allowed Haftar to extend his dominance in the east and to gain support from Salafi militias. U.S. diplomacy and encouragement further provided the green light for Haftar’s spring 2019 assault on Tripoli. Contrary to the expectation of a quick victory, however, the LNA and its allies are bogged down in the fight against the Tripoli government and its network of militias. The more resources Haftar expends to get to Tripoli, the more opportunity separatists have to regroup and reassert themselves. Even if Haftar successfully captures and consolidates power in the capital, separatist resistance could soon reemerge in the east.

The UN mediation between the Hadi government and the Houthis drew harsh criticism from Yemen’s southern separatists. Although horrifically bloody, the Houthis conflict is in some respects the most tractable of Yemen’s troubles. The Houthis largely share the international community’s vision of a single, unified Yemeni state. With Hadi in exile, the Houthis tried to keep the central bank and other state institutions operational for the whole of Yemen. The separatists, in contrast, declared themselves as a different nation from northern Yemenis and sought to sever ties to the Yemeni state entirely. The STC denounced the negotiations for ignoring southern issues and reiterated calls for secession. Houthi leaders, in turn, accuse the UAE and STC of trying to scuttle the agreement. The Saudis still reject secession and back a rival southern faction that is more conciliatory toward Hadi, opening up a rift with the UAE. Clashes between the STC and the Hadi government forces are escalating, which has allowed Houthis to gain military moment. Yemeni separatists are significant power brokers, even as the international community refuses to discuss their grievances.

Separatists defy efforts to pacify the Middle East by repairing states.

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Conclusion

Separatists defy efforts to pacify the Middle East by repairing states. Separatists are not interested in entering the fold of existing sovereign states. On the contrary, they intrinsically dispute the legitimacy of these states and believe they earned the right to self-determination within adjusted territorial boundaries. Federalism is a common response to such centrifugal pressure. Constitutional arrangements granting broad political, communal, and social autonomy might assuage moderates within the separatist camp. For example, when the PUK demurred from Barzani’s separatist gambit, they were able to fall back on Iraq’s pre-existing federalist structure. Yet such schemes are rare in the Middle East. To many, Iraq is not a model but a cautionary tale. Moreover, federalism is still only a variation on the state-building theme. Paradoxically, a strong and reliable state is a prerequisite to enacting federalist devolution. The path to attaining such a state, however, is inherently uncertain, violent, and often quixotic. Already the signs from reconstruction efforts in war-scarred Syria and Iraq are grim. Instead of offering modes of political reconciliation and economic integration, these initiatives have heightened economic and political inequalities and amount to a kind of peace of the victors. Outside interference further distorts the process, making state less accountable and more prone to repression. This sets the stage for another round of fighting and makes the need to deal with separatist demands for new states and new borders all the more salient.

Ariel I. Ahram is associate professor in Virginia Tech’s School of Public & International Affairs in Arlington and author of Break All the Borders: Separatism and the Reshaping of the Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).


18. Brooks, Rosa “Failed States, or the State as Failure?” *University of Chicago Law Review*


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**The Development of Uyghur Ethnic Nationalism and the Transition of Xinjiang Policies**

**Joe Cho-Han Hsiung**

The ongoing conflict in Xinjiang, a western province in China, is one of ethnic nationalism and statehood. The content of Uyghur ethnic nationalism has developed through time and its interaction with Chinese government should be emphasized. The increasing conflict and hatred between Han Chinese and Uyghur people have accumulated under a series of Chinese government's Xinjiang policies, and the solution to these issues should be re-considered and changed.

**1. Origins of Uyghur Ethnic Nationalism**

In 1955, Xinjiang, the territory in north-western China which used to be the Second East Turkestan Republic, officially became a part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and was designated as Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). However, distinctive internal factors made ruling XUAR extremely difficult for the PRC and cultivated ethnic nationalism in Xinjiang.

These internal factors comprise of cultural differences such as the Islamic religion and a distinct language which caused Uyghurs to regard themselves as separate from the Han Chinese. These dynamics became more significant due to the greater official tolerance for the revival of Islam and Uyghur culture after the Cultural Revolution. For example, while in the 1970s there were only 392 mosques across the region, by the end of 1981, there were 4,700 mosques. The number of Islamic schools also significantly increased in the 1980s.

Developments of Islamic culture and religion became “an ideology competing Marxism” and thus a crucial factor of Uyghurs’ political mobilizations, which threatened the stability of the Chinese regime. Further, Xinjiang did not benefit from the economic reforms targeting the rest of the country, and its economy did not transform into a market-oriented economic structure. Rather, it remained
agricultural with little industry. The region remained cut off from the rest of China. 

In 1981, Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader of the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at that time, visited Xinjiang and determined several solutions to the economic challenges mentioned above. These included inducement policies and the creation of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps.

The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) is an economic and paramilitary institution in the XUAR mainly composed of Han Chinese. Through the XPCC, Deng sent a large amount of Han Chinese to XUAR in order to exploit Xinjiang's natural resources and develop the economy. Meanwhile, inducement policies were a series of fiscal and social policies which benefited the Uyghur minority. The goal of these policies was to decrease inequality between ethnicities. For example, a policy of fixed fiscal subsidies to ethnic minority areas provided an annual increase of 10 percent in the level of subsidies from 1980 to 1989. In competitive national university entrance examinations, minority students could get extra points which made it easier for them to get into great schools. This aimed to facilitate social mobilization and minimize the gap between different areas.

However, these policies did not attain the result the PRC expected. In fact, ethnic nationalism deepened in the 1980s and threatened the stability of XUAR. In 1985, students protested in Urumqi for “Han out of Xinjiang”, and “Independence, Freedom, and Sovereignty”. In 1989, a large number of Muslims protested in Xinjiang for an incident in which an official publication disrespected Muslims. As a result, Wang Enmao, the CCP’s Committee Secretary of Xinjiang, claimed that “ethnic separatism is the main threat to the stability of Xinjiang,” which provided an ethnic explanation of Xinjiang problems. Nevertheless, this so-called “ethnic threat theory” was not emphasized by the PRC and Deng at that time. These unsolved problems thus became the challenge to Jiang Zemin, who was the next leader of the PRC.

Deng’s attitude toward Xinjiang problems was understandable. He regarded economic development as an effective solution to people’s dissatisfaction toward the Chinese government, and implemented economic reforms to solve political problems in other regions of China throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Nevertheless, the lack of valid recognition that Xinjiang’s nationalism superseded economic grievances led to unsuccessful policy duplication.

2. The 1990s Riots and the Transition of Policies

The Baren Township incident in 1990 became the first mass riot in Xinjiang of the decade. This riot reflected Uyghur’s dissatisfaction toward the PRC’s birth control policies, nuclear testing, and resource exploitation in Xinjiang. Additionally, this riot also called for “a jihad to drive Han unbelievers out of Xinjiang and establish an East Turkestan.” Hundreds of people were killed in the clash between Uyghur militants and Chinese government forces. Uyghurs’ political activities became even more violent between 1990 to 1996. There were bombing incidents in Yining, Urumqi, Kashgar, and several other cities, which caused death and injuries. The assassinations targeted government officials and their collaborators, forcing the CCP to respond. As a result, in 1996, the CCP passed the “Record of the Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party concerning the maintenance of Stability in Xinjiang,” which is usually abbreviated as the “Document #7”. In this document, they conclude:

"National separatism and illegal religious activity are the main threats to the stability of Xinjiang; implement comprehensively and correctly the ethnic and religious policy of the party and strengthen the legal control of ethnic and religious affairs.”

The importance of this document was that this was the first time the CCP officially and clearly defined conflicts in Xinjiang in terms of ethnicity and as problems which required further repression and ethnic policies aside from economic policies. Although this document still emphasized the importance of economic development, we can observe the transition of the CCP’s view and policies about Xinjiang at this time.

The Yining Incident in 1997 suggested the problematic effects of Document #7. The Yining Incident was because of the government’s restriction to a traditional form of a social gathering. The detainment of participants and the restriction of religious groups motivated the ensuing protest and riot. According to Uyghur exiles’ data, over 300 died and an additional 8,000 people were “disappeared” by the government in this riot. It is certain that the scale of the protests and the subsequent riot was unprecedentedly large. This riot became an indication that the repression policies based on Document #7 evoke strong opposition from the Uyghurs.

Further, the number of riots increased and the riots became more violent after Document #7 was published. This result shows that Document #7 and the “ethnic threat theory” did not work as well as Chinese government expected and Jiang needed to figure out an alternative to solve Xinjiang’s problems.

On the other hand, the riots also showed that the transition of policies helped to construct Uyghur ethnic nationalism. The government’s social and cultural interference
led to violent resistance and further dissatisfaction with the Chinese government among Uyghurs. Through these riots and the government’s suppression, more Uyghurs also tended to believe that the Han Chinese are unfriendly invaders and interlopers. Different from original differences between ethnic groups, such hatred was conducted by the interaction between Uyghurs and the Chinese government.

3. Western Development

In 2000, Jiang proposed and started the plan of “Western Development.” Jiang thus differed from Deng, who focused solely on economic development, by using the XPCC as a group to execute further social, cultural and economic control.

In the Western Development plan, Jiang made the XPCC more powerful in the legal system, local government, the economic system, and the military. In 2000, for example, the XPCC was able to build their own legal system in villages and local governments due to the new law. The group also became more efficient due to the reform of their organizational structure, which meant that they also were able to control the industries and business in Xinjiang more completely than before.

The development of Uyghur nationalism is a development from a primordial nationalism to a more comprehensive and complicated nationalism.

Therefore, the population of XPCC also significantly increased. According to the official record, the population of XPCC was 2.4 million people in the XUAR during the Western Development. The expansion of XPCC also made Han Chinese increase in Xinjiang and decrease the Uyghurs’ power. The XPCC was thus able to control Xinjiang more comprehensively and became the CCP’s best tool in ruling XUAR.

Considering the relative peace in Xinjiang between 2000 and 2009, Jiang’s policies can be seen as an effective solution. However, while the government was satisfied with its result of decreasing ethnic separatism in Xinjiang, the accumulation of other conflicts in Xinjiang was neglected and simplified, inspiring the development of mobilized ethnic nationalism after the 2000s.

First, the economic gap between Han Chinese and Uyghurs in Xinjiang became a severe problem. According to the statistics provided by Herbert Yee, of the 1.4 million people living in Urumqi, which was one of the richest areas in Xinjiang, about 1.1 million were Han Chinese, while only 0.2 million were Uyghurs. On the other hand, the poorest regions, such as Kizilsu Kirgiz Autonomous Prefecture and Kashgar, were traditionally Uyghur regions. The large numbers of Han Chinese also affected the Xinjiang's employment situation. Han Chinese found it easier to get jobs due to the dominance of their language and exclusionary and discriminatory hiring policies in the industries.

On a provincial level, Xinjiang depended on its oil extraction and cotton production to develop its economy. However, these industries were mostly run by the XPCC and the state. The Uyghurs were not able to profit much from these industries, although their natural resources benefited the Chinese industries in other areas. These situations exacerbated Uyghur grievances toward the Han Chinese.

Second, modernization and the increasing Han Chinese migration also led to greater cultural conflicts. In Xinjiang, the construction of modern, Western-style buildings were often regarded as the encroachment on traditional Uyghur culture by Han Chinese. The increasing migration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang left Uyghurs increasingly culturally marginalized.

Cultural conflicts and the inequality of economic conditions caused Uyghurs to regard the Han Chinese as their enemies, which strengthened the opposition between the two ethnic groups. The effect of the development of this different Uyghur ethnic nationalism could be observed in the 2009 Urumqi riot.

4. 2009 Urumqi Riot and Three Evils

The 2009 Urumqi riot started with a brawl in a toy factory in Shaoguan, Guandong province. The riot then became extremely violent and the Uyghurs started to attack the Han Chinese in the Urumqi. Han Chinese fought back. According to official statistics, the violent conflict resulted in 184 total deaths, 134 of which were Han Chinese. The mutual hatred and mistrust between the two ethnic groups were deep and the riot and conflict was a clear reflection of this.

In 2009, Hu Jintao, the paramount leader of Chinese government between 2002 and 2012, gave a speech claiming that the cause of the 2009 Urumqi riot was “Three Evils.” The Three Evils referred to “terrorism, separatism and religious extremism”. This term first emerged in 2005, while the PRC, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan founded the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This term was used frequently in official speech and documents after the 2009 Urumqi riot. This explanation became another transition of the CCP’s attitude toward Xinjiang problems, which symbolized the CCP’s attitude evolving from “ethnic threats theory” first, then “economic development,” and finally, “action against terrorism and criminals.”

In a 2009 speech, Hu emphasized that the Urumqi riot was an event which incited by terrorists and criminals. This led to the conclusion that it is necessary to establish stronger military and police control in Xinjiang instead of focusing on economic development. In his speech in July 2009, which was right after the riot, he said:
Three Evils" ignored the economic gap and cultural conflict Xinjiang has worsened and requires the attention of inter-Xinjiang's ethnic cleavages. However, the Chinese government chose to ignore the problematic economic structure and increasing cultural conflict.

We can also observe the political transition by the absence of “economic development” and the XPCC in the speech. As Hu defined this riot as an action which was caused by terrorism, separatism and religious extremism, the XPCC and economic development became less important for Hu to explain the Xinjiang problem. In other words, the theory of “Three Evils” ignored the economic gap and cultural conflict between the two ethnic groups.

At the same time, as Uyghurs were treated as terrorists and suffered from the Chinese government's brutal crackdown; people's resulting anger led to the more polarized ideology; Uyghur ethnic nationalism has thus become even more dangerous to the Chinese government and stability in the province.

5. Conclusion

The development of Uyghur nationalism is a development from a primordial nationalism to a more comprehensive and complicated nationalism. Originally, the Uyghur thought they were different from the Han Chinese due to their religion, language, and culture. However, through the increasing economic gap between different ethnic groups and areas, the ethnic nationalism after 2000 was transformed by the combination of the complex dissatisfaction toward the government and the Han Chinese into the combination of the complex dissatisfaction toward the government and the Han Chinese. Additionally, without the CCP's policies such as Western Development, such combination was not able to emerge and expand. The development of Uyghur ethnic nationalism allowed them to mobilize more people to fight against the government and for more benefit, and cause greater chaos in the XUAR.

The Chinese government tried several different approaches to solve the Xinjiang problems. Compared with Deng, Jiang and Hu did have more knowledge and recognition of Xinjiang's ethnic cleavages. However, the Chinese government failed to essentially solve the Xinjiang problems and the policies which they used worsened the problem. The Chinese government chose to ignore the problematic economic structure and increasing cultural conflict.

Under China's authoritarian regime, it is hard to rectify conflict within its political system. The brutal crackdown in Xinjiang has worsened and requires the attention of international society. External help is necessary to stop conflicts such as these. One example of successful external intervention occurred in 2018, when the violation of Uyghurs' human rights in re-education camps attracted international attention. Although the pressure from international society did not immediately stop China's policies, it effectively forced the Chinese government to disclose some important information about the re-education camps, allowing the public to further investigate its brutal policies. In addition to external factors, Uyghur ethnic nationalism will play a key role in organizing the civil society in Xinjiang. Uyghurs must find out how to channel their historical grievances into appropriate political pathways. If the Uyghur's can build a civil society, they may be able to attract more external help, which they could leverage for political power.

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Endnotes

9. Han 2013: 52.
11. Han 2013: 52.
18. Han 2013: 54.
The Venezuelan Crisis and its Regional Impact: Transforming Challenges into Opportunities for Latin America

Anderson Gómez, Lina Hernández and Roddy Enrique Rodríguez

Latin America faces the most significant migration and refugee crisis ever seen in its history. The challenges that this phenomenon pose for democracy and development are tremendous, but so are its opportunities.

Ten years ago, it was unthinkable to imagine Venezuelans desperately crossing borders in order to get food, medicines and basic goods. Nevertheless, the Venezuelan dictatorship has forced more than four million people to leave the country; upwards of 3 million Venezuelans have fled in the last two years.

One of those migrants and refugees is Daniel, who was an engineer in Venezuela. Father of two, he decided to migrate several months ago because he was unable to feed his children and find medicine for his aging mother, so he crossed the border to Colombia hoping to earn some money and send remittances back home.

Once in Colombia, he used his limited resources to buy a box of cigarettes (2 USD) and a bag of candies in order to sell individual units on the streets for 15 cents each. When having a good day, he is able to make up to 4 USD, spending 1 USD to find a place to sleep (where he has no bath, no electricity, and no mattress) and 2 USD on food, saving 1 USD. But when having a bad day, he makes less than 1 USD, forcing him to sleep on the street, abstain from eating, or both.

Stories such as that of Daniel are widespread at the border. A recent needs assessment by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) shows that a significant number of Venezuelans are reducing the number of meals eaten in a day; (55 percent of the Venezuelans surveyed answered in the last seven days they did not have enough food to eat). Their situation is drastic, forcing many migrants to choose between several ways to survive that affects them severely.

The situation urgently needs a regional and global approach to provide and strengthen immediate responses, while also taking into account the long-term challenges of regional development and democracy.

First challenge: Humanitarian response and funding

The first important challenge for the region is providing a humanitarian answer to the situation. More than 3 million Venezuelans have fled the country in only three years, second only to Syria regarding human movement. As mentioned before, migrants flee their country under very adverse conditions, facing problems such as labor and sexual exploitation, lack of shelter and education, hunger, and mendicity, among other challenges.

The international community and humanitarian organizations are providing an answer, but more help is needed. An outflow between 2 and 5 million migrants is expected in the next couple of years, and a great amount of those migrating will do so under very dire circumstances. In Venezuela, at least 8 million citizens are currently eating two or fewer times a day and 89 percent of the population currently lives below the poverty line, unable to save money as a consequence of 1 million percent inflation rates.

Additionally, border departments of receiving countries usually have little capability for absorbing migrants, let alone for attending to their national citizens. The migrants with the most needs tend to stay in these departments because they do not have enough money to buy a bus ticket in order to go elsewhere, creating a situation where they “get stuck” at the border under dire conditions.

The Syrian case can shed light on the amount of resources needed to attend the Venezuelan crisis. For a refugee population of 5 million people, the total humanitarian aid has been 12 billion USD since the crisis started in 2011. In comparison, efforts needed to protect Venezuelan migrants in 2019 currently total 146 million USD but have only been 7% funded, meaning the response is facing considerable constraints to meet even the most basic survival needs of those affected by the situation”, according to a recent UNHCR report.

Therefore, the U.N. System, International NGO’s, national and local governments have an essential role to play in providing an answer. To a certain extent, that is already happening, but more funding from the international community will be required if emergency needs are to be met in 2019. Additionally, better coordination between international organizations and national and local governments will be required in order to strengthen the capabilities of local
governments at border departments and transform into an opportunity what is a challenge today.

Second Challenge: Legal Status of Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants

The second challenge is to provide working or residence permits for Venezuelan migrants and refugees. Besides living under extreme circumstances, not having legal documentation drastically limits the access people have to basic services and rights.

In response to the situation, several governments have taken measures to welcome Venezuelans. The Colombian government established a special permit during 2017 and 2018 and the government of Peru took a similar measure during 2018. Colombia and Peru are the two countries with the most regular influx of Venezuelans, with 1.3 million and 768 thousand respectively, according to official figures.

Nevertheless, these measures only apply for those Venezuelans who entered through legal points, excluding those who entered by “Trochas” (illegally), creating an outcast population that is growing every day and which is remarkably more vulnerable and in need of assistance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Venezuelans entering Colombia daily (until November 2018)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Legally (Border points)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Illegally (Trochas)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total inflows daily</td>
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On the other hand, data suggests that migrant flows respond almost immediately to legal status incentives. Entry and exits in Colombia show the flow of Venezuelan migration, with monthly entries being slightly higher than monthly exits. Nevertheless, making a fast review of the number of Venezuelans crossing Colombian border points, we can identify months of outflow with statistically relevant changes: August-2017 and September-2018.

These changes in outflow match with changes in Colombian and Peruvian migration policies. August 2017 outflow changes coincide with Colombia’s first special permit round (PEP), 7 while September 2018 changes match with Perú’s established deadline (October 31st) to entering the country for those Venezuelans aspiring to obtain a special permit.⁸

In fact, we can trace the impact of the Peruvian incentive through the Venezuelans outflows in Ecuador, which show a remarkable change in October-2018 (see Figure 2).

That means a regional and coordinated response is needed. In such a context, it is feared that certain states would not want to create what they think could be an incentive for mass migration by giving special permits to every Venezuelan migrant and refugee. Under this scenario, some states could be tempted to see the situation as a zero-sum game, wherein they simply wait for other states to provide permits, incentivizing migrations to those countries, and therefore, what they perceive as a “gain” is another state’s “loss”.

Nevertheless, given the dire situation in Venezuela, migration will continue regardless of the legal status people could have in receiving countries. Picturing a scenario where countries do not create pragmatic coordinated responses to provide regular status for Venezuelans, they would enter their countries anyway, depriving those countries of the opportunity of having ordered migration, and making migrants and refugees more vulnerable. Besides, states unwilling to welcome Venezuelans would simply lose the opportunity to strengthen their economies, as we shall see next.

Therefore, receiving Venezuelan migrants and refugees has to be seen as a cooperative phenomenon by Latin American states. Without disregarding other options, one realistic, pragmatic and efficient course of action for Latin American governments would be to provide a document that allows Venezuelan migrants and refugees to move and work across the region. It would be a document similar to Perú’s PTP, Colombia’s PEP or the United States’ TPS, but with a regional scope which would protect Venezuelan citizens from deportation and allow migrants and refugees to work legally.

Particularly, if the issuing and administration of this document is made in a coordinated fashion, the whole region could reap the benefits. The document could be able to substitute Venezuelan passports, reducing incentives for crossing borders through trochas, given the fact that one of the critical reasons on why many Venezuelans cross borders illegally is because it is almost impossible for them to obtain a passport in Venezuela. Additionally, common
documentation could be the basis for future multilateral arrangements made by national governments to address important issues such as taxation, healthcare, and access to education for Venezuelans, among others.

Third challenge: Socio-economic integration of the Venezuelan diaspora and its contribution to Venezuelan development

Eventually, providing immediate help to those in need and providing a response to the legal status of all migrants and refugees will lead to socio-economic integration. When asked what they need, most Venezuelans reply immediately that all they want is an opportunity to work (78 percent), above other needs such as food, money for rent, or even healthcare. Taking into account that 88 percent of Venezuelans migrants and refugees are between 18 and 40 years old, the region has a unique opportunity to reap the benefits of massive migration by enjoying a demographic dividend. Three would be: 1) Preventing access to power to authoritarian leaders and 2) Respond adequately to any process of power consolidation.

Hugo Chávez took advantage of inequality, corruption, and economic crisis to rally against political actors and agitate people’s anger against the establishment. It is therefore fundamental for the whole region to promote equality, transparency, and growth in order to prevent authoritarian leaders form having chances of being elected in case of running for power.

But even in the case of being elected, authoritarian leaders can be prevented from weakening democratic institutions with early response from the international community. If international pressure and sanctions had begun, for instance in 2006 when Hugo Chávez announced it would close Venezuela’s main TV Station only because it had an independent editorial line, maybe Chávez and Maduro wouldn’t have won presidential elections in 2012 and 2013, respectively.

Preventing authoritarian leaders from accessing power and using it to destroy democratic institutions is fundamental for preventing another tragedy like that of Venezuela. Not learning from it would endanger institutions throughout the region and risk the wellbeing of millions of Latin American citizens. Therefore, it is a moral duty to respond adequately to the crisis and transform into opportunities the challenges that it poses for the region and the world. That way, the region will be able to strengthen their democracies and their economic systems, bringing lasting growth and development for their people, avoiding the scourge of tyranny and misery.

[I]t is a moral duty to respond adequately to the crisis and transform into opportunities the challenges that it poses for the region and the world.

Regarding Venezuela, the diaspora is expected to contribute to alleviating poverty in that country while Maduro’s dictatorship remains in power and has control over the currency. Recent studies estimate 30 percent of the people in the country rely solely on support from their relatives abroad to make a living in Venezuela, and that number could be expected to increase.

In a scenario where regime change is achieved and a democratic government committed to the principles of free market and rule-of-law leads Venezuelan recovery, more legal stability could boost even more remittances and foreign direct investment, which could be an important part of any recovery plan. For instance, other countries such as El Salvador and Honduras rely on remittances for their development; approximately 20.4 percent and 18.9 percent of their GDPs are composed of remittances, respectively.

Fourth Challenge: Preventing Similar Situations in the Future

What happened in Venezuela could occur to a certain extent in any other Latin American country. Most states in the region share some characteristics with late-90’s Venezuela, such as inequality and corruption, and therefore there are important lessons to be learned for the region to avoid any other democracy to degenerate into dictatorship. Those would be: 1) Preventing access to power to authoritarian leaders and 2) Respond adequately to any process of power consolidation.

There are important lessons to be learned for the region to avoid any other democracy to degenerate into dictatorship.
Brexit and the Free Movement of People: Not So Irreconcilable After All?

Berta Zabaleta

In the context of the ongoing Brexit negotiations, the UK has turned control of the free movement of people into a key matter to be incorporated into a new UK-EU trade agreement, while also aiming to maintain full access to the Single Market. These are two conflicting claims that the European Union (EU) has made clear cannot be reconciled. However, a look at past British policies on EU migration, coupled with evidence on the positive impact of the latter on the British economy, suggests that the UK political establishment may not be that interested in limiting free movement.

The free movement of people is one of the founding principles of the Single Market. It was enshrined in the Treaty of Rome (1957) alongside the other three fundamental freedoms—the free movement of capital, goods, and services. Initially, it was conceived as a way to encourage employment after World War II. In line with the thinking underpinning the birth of the European project, the underlying idea was that a mobile workforce would discourage conflict in Europe by boosting and linking its economies. Today, the free movement of people means the right to live, work, and study in any of the European Economic Area (EEA) countries—i.e., the 28 EU Member States, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway—and Switzerland. Switzerland is neither an EU nor an EEA Member but is part of the Single Market.

Overall, Europeans see the free movement of people as the greatest achievement of the European project, rating it above peace and the adoption of a single currency. However, this principle has proved controversial. In April 2013, four EU governments called on the EU to change its rules to make it harder for EU citizens to claim benefits when moving to another Member State. These governments argued that generous public benefits in their countries were attracting large numbers of migrants from the new Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004. UK Home Secretary at the time, now UK Prime Minister Theresa May referred to these citizens as “benefit tourists” who only come to access public services. In Switzerland, complaints crystallized in a 2014 referendum vote for controls on migration, which the EU ultimately discouraged by making it clear that such controls would strip Switzerland of access to the Single Market. Indeed, the EU had already “punished” Switzerland for restricting access for Croatian nationals by limiting Swiss participation in the Horizon and Erasmus programs.

The EU stance remains unchanged in the context of the Brexit negotiations: full access to the Single Market is not compatible with restrictions on the four freedoms of movement. Most important, the EU position is not likely to change for two crucial reasons. First, bending this rule by granting the UK exceptional privileges would undermine the credibility of the EU, because the free movement of people is a pillar representing its core idea that Europe is stronger together. And second, such concession would set a precedent for other countries to request similar treatment, thereby threatening the very existence of the European project.

Theresa May’s government’s insistence on ending EU migration to Britain is actually surprising if considered outside the Leave campaign context. Indeed, the UK government has never made use of the constraints it could have imposed on the free movement of people. The UK was one of only three states that did not limit migration from Eastern European countries during the first years after their incorporation to the EU in 2004. And as recently as June 2018, Britain chose not to extend for two more years limits on immigration from Croatia, which joined the EU in 2013. Finally, Britain is also
part of a minority of countries not having a registration system for EU migrants.\textsuperscript{8} Belgium does have it and holds onto EU rules allowing for deportation of EU migrants that have become a burden on state welfare to expel those who have no job after six months.\textsuperscript{9} Denmark and Austria limit migrants’ ability to buy homes, and Switzerland makes employers offer jobs to Swiss nationals first in addition to limiting property purchases.\textsuperscript{10}

Against this backdrop, it makes sense to think that the insistence of Theresa May’s government on limiting EU migration after Brexit merely owes to this having been a major pillar of the Leave campaign. Nevertheless, Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Hammond himself has criticized the Leave campaign promises for being “contradictory” and “mutually incompatible.” Indeed, while the Leave campaign gave the impression that Brexeters sought to cut EU immigration, their official policy statements were careful to only promise to control it while emphasizing full access to the Single Market.\textsuperscript{11} Most recently, the UK’s Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) attempted to match both goals by suggesting a favorable regime for very high-skilled EU migrants in exchange for better access to the Single Market.\textsuperscript{12}

However, the UK cabinet acknowledges the need for low-skilled EU migration to continue in order to sustain heavily migrant-reliant sectors including agriculture, social care, and hospitality.\textsuperscript{13} Moreover, evidence shows that any negative impact of EU migration on low-skilled UK wages is more than offset by other factors—including that migrants pay more in taxes than they take in benefits and boost overall national productivity growth.\textsuperscript{14}

In short, it seems unlikely that a post-Brexit UK-EU deal will damage the free movement of people in any significant way, first and foremost given the British interest in retaining access to the Single Market. The EU position on this issue has been consistently firm and will likely remain so for the sake of the Union’s very existence. Additionally, both past UK policy on EU migration and evidence of its impact on the British economy suggest it is actually not in the interest of the UK government to cut it. While such an outcome would anger many Leave voters and thus erode the legitimacy of the current UK administration, an agreement that significantly limited EU migration would result in even greater harm to legitimacy as the economic performance of an isolated UK would plummet.

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1. (Horan 2016, 3, 5)
Nicholas de Genova’s concept of the border spectacle allows us to view borders as more than just lines on a map or a means of separating nations; they can and should be viewed as spaces of interaction, collaboration, and contestation which bring about the classification and filtering of peoples. Thus, it becomes easier to understand how physical borders are recreated in everyday life, one such way being the notion of illegality and the ways in which citizenship status affects migrants’ experiences, encounters, and claims to rights and resources. These labels, incidences, and feelings become internalized by migrants. In doing so, borders and immigration impact personal health and wellbeing.

This paper presents the challenges faced by undocumented immigrants living in New York City, navigating the reconstructed borders found within the U.S. healthcare system. I argue that immigration practices have a direct impact on physical and mental health, as well as an indirect impact through altered and limited decision-making. The results of hampered decision-making are not only confined to choices made surrounding one’s health, but rather go so far as to impact the possibility and likelihood of an immigrant’s repatriation. With muddled discourse surrounding the “right to health,” and the preconceived, racially-biased notions of deservingness permeating the healthcare sector, personal narratives often get drowned out — particularly those of undocumented immigrants. This paper aims to bring to light the distinct predicaments that an undocumented immigrant may face in trying to manage his/her health, in the hopes of overcoming misconstrued perceptions and prompting meaningful resolutions.

Take, for example, “Alejandro,” a Mexican native who immigrated to the United States without authorization back in 1985. Since then, he has worked in various sectors, ranging from construction to retail, until he landed a job as a backroom associate and stocker in a specialty food market in New York, where he has worked now for over 15 years. Upon first glance, one might not pick up on the ways in which immigration practices influenced Alejandro’s career trajectory or health, but Alejandro’s obstacles are the result of systemic inequality and racial prejudice in the U.S. labor system. In his first construction job as a migrant worker, Alejandro suffered a significant injury when he fell down several stories of scaffolding and onto the pavement below. Due to a lack of proper safety equipment, training, and tethers, in combination with dangerous working conditions, Alejandro sustained a concussion and now, years later, attributes a current eye impairment to that incident. For lack of worker’s compensation, which certainly should have been doled out in this instance, and because of his status as an undocumented immigrant, Alejandro never pursued legal action or recourse and was not able to afford proper medical attention and continued care. Here, one is able to see the prejudicial mental health effects and ramifications of citizenship statuses which aim to parcel out state services and resources in a discriminatory manner as part of the border regime.

This assertion is supported by Seth Holmes’ detailed account of the ethnicity-citizenship-labor hierarchy that migrant workers on the Tanaka farm often faced, wherein:

“the more Mexican and the more ‘indigenous’ one is perceived to be, the more psychologically stressful, physically strenuous, and dangerous one’s job... the farther down the ladder from Anglo-American U.S. citizen to undocumented indigenous Mexican one is positioned, the more physically taxing the work, the more exposure to weather and pesticides, the more fear of the government, and the less control over one’s own time.”

Holmes’ points on dangerous working conditions, fear, overwork, and lack of control or agency extend beyond the experiences of migrant workers in U.S. agriculture, and can be applied to describe migrant work in nearly all fields.

The prejudicial mental health effects and acts of structural violence immigrants face in the U.S. are more difficult to address as a result of normalized racist sentiment and the inequitable labor system practices that result from it. For instance, Holmes writes about how “the public gaze – especially that of the wealthy public who shop at elite grocery stores and live in exclusive neighborhoods – is trained away and spatially distanced from the migrant farmworkers.” Job placements such as Alejandro’s seem deliberate; he was placed in the backroom, loading and docking area, transporting boxes of produce and stocking shelves, always intended to be as out of sight as possible from affluent customers.

After having explored the physical and mental health effects of immigration and borders, as well as the structures and practices in place that allow for these effects to be carried out, what’s left is to explore the indirect effects that the complex relationship between immigration, health, and decision-making has on migrants’ lives. Immigration directly impacts health; the health effects sustained then influence and usually limit decision-making for health matters as well as greater life choices; therefore, immigration and borders indirectly yet thoroughly and regularly regulate and impede decision-making, stripping away a certain level of agency from migrants. It should be noted that the impacted decision-making is not limited to decisions surrounding the migrant’s health, but also affects decisions surrounding
different aspects of their life, even their decision to return or continue their immigration journey.

In order to understand the indirect manner in which immigration and borders impact health, the social structures and attitudes surrounding these matters are essential. Borders allow states to separate and classify more than just land, but people, as well. Feelings of belonging, otherness, and notions of illegality begin to develop, and nations take advantage of these labels to apportion resources and rights to individuals, generally granting more to their constituents and citizens than to migrants and refugees. Sarah S. Willen comprehensively writes, “Put bluntly, neither the state nor society finds unauthorized im/migrants’ health, or their lives, particularly deserving of attention or concern.” It is this type of social and institutional disregard and inequity when it comes to migrants’ health, particularly undocumented migrants, that pushes them to seek out informal parallel health services. Yet many of the alternative healthcare services that immigrants seek out are ineffective and unsafe.

Undocumented immigrants typically do not own health insurance and thereby cannot access affordable healthcare. As an alternative, some meet with a curandero: a traditional native healer who uses home remedies to cure illnesses and injuries. Yet finding a curandero often depends on luck, demonstrating a lack of agency or control when it comes to healthcare for undocumented immigrants. Accessing parallel healthcare services depends on connections that can be difficult to establish, even after decades.

Perhaps as a result of the internalization of labels and illegality, undocumented migrants do not necessarily see the state or government as being responsible for their care, which is why they seek out parallel services. This speaks to the vastly misconstrued idea of deservingness; while the so-called deservingness of migrants, particularly undocumented, is often called into question, not enough efforts are extended to allow for undocumented migrants to access and willingly pay for their healthcare. Willen regards the concept in a similar fashion, stating on her findings of unauthorized im/migrants in Tel Aviv, Israel, that the majority of her survey’s respondents did not expect government handouts, but difficult life circumstances prevented them from going against the im/migrant “freeloader” stereotype. Many would purchase health insurance if available, but undocumented immigrants are currently ineligible to do so in the United States, as well as in many other countries around the world.

Undocumented immigrants are excluded entirely from the ACA’s various individual insurance provisions, as are some individuals with temporary status (e.g., TPS or DACA). Thus undocumented immigrants have no other option but to seek out alternative healthcare services.

Some might argue that we are only criticizing parallel healthcare systems because we are looking at it from a Western-medicine perspective, and that we should not interfere with migrants’ health because it is so closely tied to their culture, citing these oftentimes indigenous curanderos as example. However, culture does not necessarily have to be sacrificed to the simple option and easy access to Western healthcare systems. Immigrants, particularly undocumented immigrants who are excluded from the Affordable Care Act and other relevant healthcare legislation, should have the right (and viable options to exercise that right) to a more formal, state run healthcare system if they so please. Alejandro’s late wife, who was also undocumented, had cancer and waited too long to go to the hospital for her symptoms due to fear of deportation, not for a desire to preserve her culture through the use of a curandero. Moreover, Jonathan M. Metzl and Helena Hansen argue for a sort of cultural competency in the healthcare system that would help health workers home in on the social injustices and obstacles to equitable healthcare their patients may face, without over-emphasizing culture in a biased or negative manner, allowing for positive structural change.

Decisions regarding parallel healthcare services are just one of the ways in which immigration and borders indirectly affect health. If and when a migrant’s health is negatively impacted by their experiences with immigration practices and recreated borders, not only are their decisions about where to seek medical help impacted, but so are their general and greater life decisions. Alejandro has revealed his wish to return to Mexico soon, and though he did not make the direct connection — i.e. he did not state, “I want to go home because of my pains and the many obstacles I have encountered here in the U.S. as an immigrant,” — several of his individual statements came together in such a way that highlights the subliminal yet serious impact personal health can have on decision-making. For instance:

“Yea, that takes away the pain a little bit. But my tendons are already messed up beyond repair, those are never going to get better;”

“I think I’m just going to see how long I can last here;”

“When I was talking over the phone with my sister she told me that I should go back home so that they can cure me.”

All of the aforementioned statements divulge his fatigue resulting from having worked so many years in hard labor jobs, a disillusion of his current living conditions and the question of how long he can continue to put up with the challenges he faces, and a desire for a healthcare system that’s easier for him to maneuver, as well as a simple and
overall want for long-term, sustainable health and happiness. Although it may appear as though Alejandro has the agency and independence to ultimately decide and contemplate these matters of his own accord, one cannot help but wonder whether he would have contemplated the decision to return if it weren’t for having to confront recreated borders and systemic inequality in his everyday experiences in the U.S.

While many nativists often call for the assimilation of immigrants and refugees, which would entail immigrants “exchanging their ethnic and cultural behaviours for the practices and norms of the receiving society,”10 the social systems and immigration practices that states themselves impose restrict immigrants’ and refugees’ ability to assimilate via their health and decision-making. If, for instance, they are not allowed to purchase health insurance, they will not have access to traditional Western medicine and hospitals and are forced to revert to more cultural and traditional healing practices and service providers.

Much of the current literature on migrants’ and refugees’ wishes to return to their countries of origin focuses on social ties, employment or wages,12 gender,13 education level and language proficiency, and amount of contact with native population. Throughout this paper, I have shown that a key factor is being left out of the research on this topic of return and resettlement: that of the migrant’s or refugee’s health. Moreover, I have reframed the right to health as the right to decision-making and agency. Recounting personal narratives such as that of Alejandro and other undocumented immigrants, a severely disadvantaged subset of migrants when it comes to healthcare access and coverage, helps break through the puzzling, divided, partisan, and abstract discussions surrounding the “right to health,” and allows us to see the real-life effects of prejudiced immigrant and healthcare legislation. Undocumented migrants need greater healthcare coverage and to be able to access it without a fear of deportations or of encountering recreated borders in the hospital or the pharmacy. Furthermore, for the migrants who are documented and have some claim to rights, credibility needs to be granted so that their health concerns are heard and that their ‘deservingness’ remain unquestioned.

Many claim the U.S. healthcare system is broken and difficult for Americans themselves to navigate. I propose that in granting immigrants of all statuses equal access to the system, solutions that benefit the weakest members of our society will also benefit the strongest members. As the entire healthcare system is faulty, a solution or way to benefit the weakest members will likely help address one of the systemic issues in access to healthcare for all. In order to even approach such an idea, greater awareness of im/migrant encounters and experiences with healthcare systems has to be cultivated. Undocumented immigrants, especially, often have their experiences and obstacles sidelined; intentionally so in increasingly hostile political climates. Thus, the stories and difficulties of undocumented immigrants navigating healthcare systems must be brought to light, with an emphasis on their physical and emotional resilience, as well as their willingness to demonstrate agency in decisions if granted the chance.

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Advisor: David Aftab Ansari, instructor of the class "Borders, (Im) mobilities and Human Rights.”

Endnotes
Written with an eye on prevailing narratives, the passionate Balkan observer can find solidarity with Jasmin Mujanovic’s recent work, *Hunger and Fury: The Crisis of Democracy in the Balkans*. Too often, greater Balkan society and the complex democratic transitions in former Yugoslavia are denied an autochthonous perspective in favor of tired, managerial-style ceremony by Euro-Atlantic integrationists. Or, at the worst extent, this perspective is brushed aside for distant analysis, more concerned with subsuming the Balkans into a wider study on great power politicking. This approach is a result of the significant drawdown of European and American attention to the Balkans since 2001, and it confers little respect for the Balkan citizenry who are so critical to the area’s nascent democracies. Mujanovic seeks to correct this in a tidy volume. A Sarajevo native himself who has researched and written on the region extensively, Mujanovic dedicates much of his book to highlighting the existence of ‘elastic authoritarians’ dominating the Balkans, their origin, and why they undermine and ultimately make fragile the democratic reforms entities like the European Union take for granted. The definition of elastic authoritarianism, as a process of persistent ideological mutation which elites employ in the midst of economic and political stagnation to deliberately stunt social change, is the text’s main contribution to democracy studies, and explaining this concept throughout the book is an interdisciplinary process. All the while, Mujanovic presents an account of Balkan civil society and a truly democratic groundswell that grows parallel to elastic authoritarianism. This groundswell, manifesting in protests and mass movements that ignore ethnic and national lines, represents the true desires of a region too commonly boiled down to the whims of its elites, known for their fallbacks to nationalist rhetoric. What Mujanovic has thus done with his book is ‘democratized’ the study of Balkan democracy, stridently presenting new perspectives while nonetheless contending with the old.

Despite focusing on the subject of democracy, *Hunger and Fury* is appropriately sober. As nearly every chapter attests, southeastern Europe is in a steadily deteriorating situation, with the very concept of democracy perverted for the sake of a few enterprising elites who shore each other up while an increasingly myopic and sycophantic international community (most especially, the European Union) looks on. The text cites Sheldon Wolin often to punctuate its points about the nature of substantive democratization—namely, that it has to be a grassroots effort. Contrary to the view that democracy has taken root, a true democracy that would allow greater meaning and participation for citizens is just now emerging in many Balkan states, and this ‘fugitive moment’ (echoing Wolin) is at risk of being smothered by authoritarians watching for the decline of a Euro-Atlantic world. Perhaps the most provocative parts concern the European Union, an institution that still commands popularity among Balkan populations. The EU assumes its pull will continue to guide Balkan governments toward its ideals and bring Balkan elites into respecting the liberal democratic model, but *Hunger and Fury* is ardent in its arguments against this. To anybody privy enough to witness the admonishment of a Balkan official by an EU counterpart, Mujanovic’s brief lesson in chapters one and two over the brigands and warlords that so characterize modern Balkan history will make a cogent point: many people working for the government of Serbia, Croatia, or Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) today have outlived not only several regimes, but several types of regime. A wary eye on the future will guarantee a place in a new order if it comes—with or without the EU. As it is now, many Balkan elites are content to manufacture crises that the EU will then depend on them to fix. In other words, they start fires to put them out. It is difficult to argue against this when reading Mujanovic’s text alongside the EU’s approach on the current refugee crisis, which rewards countries such as Serbia and Hungary with support for stricter border controls, even when their approach to refugees crossing their territory exacerbated the crisis in the first place. Much could be read in Turkey’s situation, as well—after a deal was reached wherein the EU would literally pay President Erdogan’s Turkey to keep migrants in its borders, Erdogan turned around and threatened to scuttle the arrangement when the EU took issue with his abrupt authoritarian shift. Observing modern events after reading the book, it becomes clear that rather than grapple with the prospect of further chaos in the Balkans, and perhaps traumatized by the breakdown of Yugoslavia which saw its own refugee crisis, the EU continually backs those with authoritarian tendencies,
moving their countries forward on an integration timeline even while democratic values such as tolerance for opposition parties and a free press come under attack.

In short, democracy in the Balkans is threatened, and there is much to lament in the post-Yugoslavia world that let this happen. Mujanovic returns time and time again to missed opportunities that could have set countries such as Serbia and BiH on a more robust, democratic path. Ethnic antagonisms and nationalisms, misleadingly pinned on the Balkans and used to justify the continued ethnic cantons of Balkan states, are not the default setting for Balkan people. Rather, as the ‘Bosnian Spring’ in BiH and the surprise ousting of Nikola Gruevski by a multiethnic coalition of political parties in Macedonia display, there is a common cause among nearly all Balkan inhabitants: anti-corruption. Yet the prospect of one of these movements actually toppling one of the international community’s favored ‘elastic authoritarians’ prompts no international support for grassroots causes, and transitions were supposed to fix instead continue. This is the crux of the book: it implores the reader to find continuity in the Balkan states and in how their elites govern, and not to blare the triumphalist horn of the new neoliberal order.

Chapter three thus puts all of the historical context and misconceptions in a bleak telling of the future. As doubt about the longevity of the politically-chaotic EU and United States sets in, elastic authoritarians are going to look elsewhere for patronage. Russia’s influence in the Balkans is heavy by this point, with its traditional relationship with Serbia and its heavy-handed interference in the democratic practices of Montenegro and Macedonia, both of whom pushed on toward Euro-Atlantic integration. China will increasingly provide money and investment the EU withholds, enriching authoritarians if necessary. These two countries, along with Turkey, are all willing to overtly support authoritarianism where the EU is not. By acceding to elastic authoritarians for so long, the EU has ensured that they make the transition to the next Balkan regional order, which will probably see less lip service paid to liberal democracy and a lot of profiting off chaos; (the recent maritime spat between Slovenia and Croatia, long considered ‘well-adjusted’ former Yugoslavian members, emphasizes this).

Some critiques emerge from the last two chapters. As the author himself explains, Hunger and Fury is not strict in its focus. It is written as a combination of political theory, comparative politics, international relations, and commentary. The first half of the book sets up historical causes for Balkan problems and reexamines periods such as the Ottoman Empire’s decline in great detail, but does not do the same for the interwar (World War I and World War II) period. Thus, it is also something of a history book, but very particular in what history it looks at. There is little comparison between the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires when describing the basis for elastic authoritarianism. But it is also a text most heavily-focused on the former Yugoslavia, making it unclear how much of the Balkans it wants to apply itself to. I found myself wondering whether or not I would recommend it to someone visiting the Balkans for the first time, were they on a study trip or something similar. While it contains valuable insight and context that would provide a counterpoint to many outsiders’ preconceived notions, its multidisciplinary nature also makes it opaque to those not already steeped in a lot of the debates and peculiarities of Balkan society. Fundamentally, the book will compete with wrong-headed but enduring narratives espoused by popular commentary books like Balkan Ghosts, but cannot simplify to their level, and in so doing runs the risk of being brushed aside. Each chapter could be a different book, but chapter three in particular covers the international arena, something far-removed from the examinations of kleptocracy in chapters one and two or the grassroots movements given a case study treatment in chapter four. Nonetheless, the book would serve as a valuable companion to anyone venturing blind into the Balkans for the first time and trou-
bled by the disconnect between democratic rhetoric and democratic practice.

The concept of elastic authoritarianism is clear, crisp, and infinitely expanded on in both scholarly terms and with practical examples. The idea can easily be transplanted to other regions and contexts, but instead the book spends its last half making a different argument concerning the longevity of Euro-Atlantic influence and proposing a coming wave of social movements in the Balkans that will represent another ‘fugitive moment’ that could change the current kleptocratic standard. Certainly, the case studies brought up in Slovenia, BiH, and Macedonia attest to the frustration felt among Balkan citizens, and how it can easily be translated into mass protest or social mobilization. But how to get to social transformation is left ambiguous. The ‘Bosnian Spring’ in particular is given a detailed account, explaining how a protest movement started over basic economic concerns in BiH and spread across ethnic cantons. Yet it is unclear what the European Union or the United States should do with these movements. Is it better to let them happen without interference, or to support them? Some passages discuss the Otpor movement in Serbia, which had considerable outside support, but whether or not this support was necessary to replicate for other movements isn’t elaborated on. More importantly, it would seem that given the conclusions of chapter one and three, any outside support for civil society in the midst of a mass movement might cause elites to turn to other countries like China and the Gulf states more quickly. But the basic warning of the book is still clear from the last chapter: the EU must stop acting on autopilot, and Balkan elites must do the same. A more participatory, genuine democracy, rather than the one favored by traditional Balkan elites, will have its opportunity soon, and all, the project for Balkan democracy has to be a movement, across borders and ethnic lines because, as Mujanovic’s book emphasizes, the elites fighting against a true democracy travel across borders and confer with one another constantly. True Balkan democrats must do the same.

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We welcomed our 13th incoming class to the Democracy & Governance M.A. program during the 2018-2019 academic year. Welcome to Henry Atem Oben, William Condon, Yuchu He, Matison Hearn-Desautels, Joe Cho-Han Hsiung, Hashim Pasha, James Placius, and Habiba Shebita.

The second annual Democracy & Governance Summer Book Club ran during summer 2018, offering students, alumni, and friends of the program the chance to gather for casual discussion of timely books. This summer’s theme was Democracy and Dystopia.

The Democracy & Governance Program partnered with the GU’s The Laboratory for Global Performance and Politics, the Baker Center for Leadership & Governance, and Patrick Henry College to launch “In Your Shoes,” a cross-campus project in theatrical performance and dialogue. The project brought together undergraduate students from Georgetown and Patrick Henry in a process that used active listening, exchange, and performance to help build bridges in contrast to the polarization that marks American democracy today. The program culminated with performances on both campuses in April, 2019. You can learn more at www.inyourshoes.site

We launched our first study abroad experience in June 2019. Program Director Daniel Brumberg offered a new summer course on democratic consolidation that involved an intensive 10-day study trip to Tunisia. Students had the opportunity to meet with leaders from a variety of fields to better understand the challenges on the ground as the country moves forward in the democratization process.

On October 25th, 2018 the Democracy & Governance Program hosted its annual career panel. This year we were joined by Virginia L. Bennett (former Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor), Marin Ping ’17 (Freedom House), and Marcelo Buitron ’11 (World Bank).

On November 7th, 2018 Prof. Anatol Lieven joined the Democracy and Governance Program for a lunch discussion entitled “Why a New Cold War with Russia Does Not Serve Western Interests.”

On November 9th, 2018 the Democracy and Governance Program and the GU Center for Contemporary Arab Studies co-hosted David Kirkpatrick of the New York Times for an event on “Military, State and Politics: America’s Role in Egypt and the Rise of Sisi.”

On November 9th, 2018 the Democracy and Governance Program partnered with the GU African Studies Program and the U.S. International Center for Electoral Support for an event entitled “Professional Election Administration and the Promotion of Democracy in Africa.” The event featured a panel discussion with Justice Dr. Jane Ansah (Chairperson, Malawi Elections Commission), Mr. Cebukati Wafula (Chairman, Independent Election and Boundary Commission of Kenya), and Mrs. Aisha Lubega (Deputy Chairperson, Electoral Commission of Uganda).

On November 14th, 2018 Jennifer Kavanagh, Ph.D. of the RAND Corporation present her recent report on “Truth Decay: The Diminishing Role of Facts and Analysis in American Public Life” in an event co-hosted by the Democracy and Governance Program and the M.A. in American Government Program.

On February 25th, 2019 our Associate Director Prof. Jennifer Dresden, Prof. Irfan Nooruddin of the GU School of Foreign Service, and Prof. Thomas Flores of George Mason University presented a recent USAID-funded report on the state of academic knowledge on the relationship between democracy and armed conflict.

On March 14th, 2019 the Democracy and Governance Program welcomed admitted students for an Open House evening that featured a discussion with Lisa Dickieson (Senior Vice President Programs, Freedom House). The formal program was followed by an opportunity for admitted students to meet current students and alumni.