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Letter from the Director

Dr. Elton Skendaj

Welcome to this year's edition of *Democracy & Society*, the result of the hard work of Editors Evan Mann and Yusuf Can, and Assistant Editors Leesa Danzek and Charlene Batlle. The 2022-2023 academic year was another busy one at our Democracy & Governance Program. We said farewell to Program Coordinator, Rick Ferreira, as he moved on to new projects, and welcomed new Assistant Director Bryson Daniels. Professor Daniel Brumberg is now Senior Advisor in the Program and Professor Jeffrey Fischer is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Democracy and Civil Society. I am also grateful for the hard work of the program staff and student workers Milan Bailey, Abby Carlson and Ruwaidah Maudarbux.

In the fall, we welcomed our 17th class of incoming students. We also said farewell in the spring to 14 graduating students who are starting careers in the field. You can find more about the events and developments of the year in the Program Highlights section of this issue.

This issue of *Democracy & Society* opens with a special reflection by Professor Thomas Zimmer, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) visiting professor at Georgetown University's BMW Center for German and European Studies. His evaluation situates contemporary applications of democracy within its historical and political evolution, detailing how demographics and power politics have interacted with and against perceptions of democracy.

The remaining contributions focus on the theme of this issue, Democracy and Equality, addressing issues in Citizenship, Social Contract and the State, Social Spending and Public Education, and Climate Change and Migration.

Christopher Kiyaseh examines the impact of climate change on Arctic marine food security in indigenous counties in Norway. Warming temperatures are melting the Arctic ice, and the government is pushing for green energy projects such as hydroelectric dams or nuclear reactors. Such changes are causing land displacement among the indigenous Sámi people and the decline of Atlantic salmon production, thus undermining the livelihoods and equality of minority citizens in democratic Norway.

Natalie Chaudhuri examines the impact of regime type on climate change policies in Central America by contrasting authoritarian Nicaragua and democratic Costa Rica. Both countries face natural disasters, deforestation and climate displaced people. However, Costa Rica's sustainability models are superior and more effective since they encourage citizen engagement and participation.

Kara Joyce investigates the impact of forced migration due to climate change in the small Pacific Island country of Kiribati and its impact on women. She points out that people who are forced to flee due to climate change do not have the protections of refugees, and climate change disproportionally impacts women in patriarchal societies such as Kiribati. While politicians in Kiribati have pioneered two strategies for dealing with loss of land due to sea level rise, the turnover in government inhibits the implementation of both plans.

Keven Hernandez investigates climate change and migration in Southeast Asia, an area that is relying on coal and fossil fuel to develop. Hernandez argues for a new international regime that will help facilitate equitable administration of migratory flows, as well as provide incentives for green infrastructure investments. Such policies would help address the populist challenges to migration flows in the West.

Sooin Choi examines the structural and cultural barriers to retaining foreign talented workers in Singapore and Dubai. Both countries rely

on foreign workers to enhance the knowledge economy. Dubai makes it very difficult for foreign talent to legally pursue permanent residency. While Singapore allows foreign talent to apply for permanent residency, its hostile cultural environment discourages workers from staying long term.

Hadley Spadaccini investigates how the cooptation of lower and lower middle class in student movements in the 1980s paved the way for democratic breakthroughs through nonviolent protests. As a consolidated democracy in a globalized economy, South Korea now faces the challenges of meeting the current needs or poorer citizens who face relatively lower wages compared to rising rent and household expenditures. Spadaccini speculates that if poorer citizens find that the democratic state is not meeting their material needs, they might turn to dominant populist leaders who would incrementally undermine democratic institutions, thus leading to democratic erosion.

Déliana Renou examines the welfare states in post-communist European countries, arguing that they are following the model of EU welfare capitalist states in which the state is targeting the neediest individuals, and leave to the market the general welfare. Renou points out that this represents a rupture from the previous communist model of providing extensive social protections in terms of employment and welfare, despite low levels of social protections. Renou is skeptical that there will be a convergence in post-communist welfare states with the EU welfare states due to communist legacies.

Olivia Bauer analyzes service provisions by criminal organizations as she compares Cosa Nostra in Italy with La Familia Michoacána/The Knights Templar. When the organized group does not provide quality services to its citizens, they lose the trust and cooperation from citizens, and it is easier for the state to undermine the criminal group.

We hope you will enjoy this issue, and we invite you to contribute to the blog at www.democracyandsociety.net. You can find more information about the Democracy and Governance Program at our website: https://government.georgetown.edu/democracy-and-governance/.

Elton Skendaj, PhD, is the Director of the Democracy & Governance Program.

What We Are Fighting Over

Dr. Thomas Zimmer

How much democracy - and for whom? That is the question defining the current political conflict across the "West."

I

For well over a decade, the idea that liberal democracy is in crisis has dominated the political and broader public discourse. Politicians, journalists, pundits, and academic observers in the "West" seem to broadly agree that the current era is defined by democratic erosion and "backsliding." The evidence seems overwhelming: Brexit in the UK, the election of Donald Trump in the United States, the success of far-right parties and rightwing populists across Europe – all of it seemingly indicating strong authoritarian leanings amongst the broader electorate in the "West" and a dangerous amount of skepticism towards the foundations of liberal democracy.[1]

However, much of the pervasive "crisis" discourse is predicated on an assumption that does not hold up to serious historical or political scrutiny: that "Western" societies on either side of the Atlantic were, until quite recently, stable, liberal democracies, having only recently come under pressure as more and more people have somehow, suddenly, turned their backs on this

liberal democratic order.

Ideas of a glorious democratic tradition play a particularly pronounced role in the United States, where they feature prominently in the national imaginary. While it is not necessarily incorrect to describe the U.S as the oldest democracy in the world, depending on the definition of "democracy," such a notion obscures more than it illuminates about the reality of American life.[2] If we start from the assumption that America has been a stable, consolidated democracy for two and a half centuries, the current political conflict seems utterly baffling: Why are so many millions of Americans supporting a demagogue who has once before tried to end democratic self-government and constitutional rule? Is it really plausible to assume that the people who remain united behind Donald Trump and are now openly embracing authoritarianism were fully on board with liberal democracy until recently, before they were suddenly driven rightward?

II

Making sense of the current political conflict requires a more precise understanding of the past and present of democracy, beyond simplistic ideas of "democracy vs. authoritarianism." We should recognize that, historically, the term "democracy" applied to polities and societies that differed widely in terms of who was actually allowed and enabled to participate in the political process as equals – and even more so with regards to whether or not they extended the democratic promise to other spheres of life beyond politics, to the workplace, the family, the public square. Democracy should be explored and assessed not as a yes-or-no proposition, but on a scale – with an emphasis on change over time and on changing practical realities, on how democracy actually structures the lives and experiences of the people.

What is a democracy, and what makes a democracy liberal?[3] Without getting stuck in the quicksand of definitional quarrels, "liberal democracy," in widely accepted parlance today, means something like this: A representative

system of government that plays by majoritarian rules, in which all citizens count equally – not just on paper, but in practice – and get a chance to participate as equals in all matters affecting the polity. Quibble with parts of the definition if you like, but the fact remains that we have not seen many – or any? – political orders that would satisfy these key demands, certainly not liberal democratic orders under conditions of multiracial pluralism. The norm on either side of the Atlantic has been a system that was a lot more democratic for some – for white, cisgender men, in particular – and a lot less for others: Narrowly restricted forms of democracy that left traditional hierarchies of race, gender, religion, and wealth largely intact.

From a longer-term historical perspective, what actually happened over the past few decades is that due to political, social, cultural, and – most importantly, perhaps – demographic developments, "Western" societies have become less white, less Christian, and more pluralistic. It is in many ways the traditional norm of white Christian patriarchal dominance that is experiencing a crisis and is under threat to be finally upended by an actualized egalitarian, multiracial, pluralistic democracy. Somewhat paradoxically, the acute danger to the democratic order results from exactly this process of democratization and liberalization, as reactionary forces who are not willing to abandon traditional hierarchies are feeling under siege, which fuels their anti-democratic radicalization and increasingly open embrace of authoritarianism.

Since the founding, two incompatible ideas of how to define the nation have shaped the American project. From the beginning, some believed that America was to be a place where all people were created equal – a form of civic nationalism, as historian Gary Gerstle has put it, that demanded an egalitarian democratic order.[4] But the proponents of such egalitarian ideas have always fought an uphill battle. For much of the nation's history, an ethno-religious nationalism was dominant, conceptualizing America as a nation of white Christian patriarchal norms. In practice, before the

civil rights legislation of the 1960s, American democracy described a system that was, at least by contemporaneous comparison, fairly egalitarian if a person happened to be a white Christian man – and something else entirely if they were not. America's first attempt at biracial democracy immediately after the Civil War was quickly drowned in ostensibly "race-neutral" laws and white reactionary violence before it was fully abandoned in the late 1870s.[5] After Reconstruction, the country was dominated for decades by a white elite consensus to not only leave the brutal apartheid regime in the South untouched, but to uphold white Christian patriarchal rule within the confines of a restricted version of democracy.

Attempts to restrict the promise of equal participation within a system defined as democratic have not been confined to U.S. history. Take the example of democracy's near-miraculous re-birth in Western Europe after 1945, for instance. Within ten years of the end of the Second World War, and within about fifteen years of democracy having almost vanished from the continent by the end of the interwar period, almost all Western European societies had been (re-)established as democracies. But almost across the board, these were stability-first systems that focused on establishing dependable institutions, organizations, and rituals of democracy in all their bureaucratic non-glory – with a strong government, strong executives, a strong state machinery. They were decidedly not focused on extending participation. On the contrary, political and societal elites were often distrustful of their electorates – an attitude that strongly echoed the pervasive derision of the "masses" and of "mass democracy" that had been so characteristic of the interwar period. This was, for obvious reasons, most pronounced in West Germany. As a result, these were top-down polities, with elites very much worried about potential "excesses" of too much democracy, trying to roll back any attempt at democratizing society and culture.[6]

III

The post-war model of restricted elite democracy did not go unchallenged. Across the "West," the period from the 1950s through the early 1970s was characterized by demands to democratize not just politics, but all spheres of life. The widespread student protests of the 1960s were one way this critique of the status quo manifested. They erupted in around 60 countries, and not just in the "West," but also in the Eastern Bloc as well as in the postcolonial Global South.[7] While these protests had a variety of different origins and contexts, the most striking similarity was the fact that they were led by a younger generation that had come of age after the Second World War and was animated by a deeply felt sense of frustration, disillusionment, and disappointment because of the dramatic gap between what the state had promised and the reality of the status quo.

In the "West," it was the gap between the promise of egalitarian democracy and the persistence of traditional hierarchies. Nowhere was this more drastic than in the U.S. – a country defined by the stark discrepancy between the mantra that "All men are created equal," as the Declaration of Independence had promised, and the reality of a racial caste society. It was only the civil rights revolution of the 1950s and 60s that finally set the U.S. on a path towards being a semi-functioning, truly multiracial democracy.

Left-leaning and progressive movements and parties across the "West" look back at this moment with nostalgia for a better past. In the collective memory of Western Europe's Left, it was the heyday of social-democratic glory, when all was well before the descent into neoliberalism; in the U.S., the liberal camp tends to mythologize the era of the Warren Court as a time of inevitable and irreversible progress. But the conflict over how much democracy, and for whom, did not end there; progress, to the extent it was achieved, proved decidedly fragile, and the question of who should be included in the democratic promise remained strongly contested. The racial and social progress of the middle decades of the twentieth century was answered by a reactionary counter-mobilization against what was perceived as "too much democracy."

In many ways, the reaction was most influential in the United States. As the white male elite consensus started to fracture, America split over the question of whether or not the country should extend the promise of democracy to all its citizens. The 1960s civil rights legislation set in motion a process of partisan realignment and ideological sorting – ultimately uniting the forces opposing multiracial pluralism in a Republican Party that has been focused almost solely on the interests and sensibilities of white conservatives.[8] And white conservatives tend to define America – "real America" – as a predominantly white, Christian, patriarchal nation. America, to them, is supposed to be a place where traditional authority is revered and wealthy white Christian men are at the top.

Modern conservatism as a political project arose in the middle decades of the twentieth century as an alliance between traditionalists who were unwilling to accept America as anything but a society defined by white Christian patriarchy and market-fundamentalist libertarians who rejected any attempt to regulate the economy and "free enterprise" – with a lot of personal and ideological overlap between those two camps.[9] What they all agreed on was that democracy was the enemy: They staunchly opposed any leveling of traditional hierarchies of race, gender, religion, and wealth, which they saw as the natural and/or divinely ordained order. The GOP's overriding concern since at least the 1970s, when conservatives became the dominating faction within the party, has been to preserve that "natural" order. In other words, conservatives' allegiance has never been to democratic ideals – their acceptance of democracy was always conditional and depending largely on whether or not it would be set up in a way that allowed for the forces of multiracial pluralism to be kept in check.

IV

Due to political, cultural, and most importantly demographic developments, the conservative political project has come under enormous pressure, nowhere more so than in the U.S. As the country has become less white, less religious, and more pluralistic, the conservative hold on power has become tenuous. Nothing symbolized this threat to white dominance like the election of Barack Obama. Obama's presidency dramatically heightened the white conservative fear of demographic change that would supposedly be accompanied by a loss of political and cultural dominance.

Republicans understand better than anyone else: In a functioning democracy, they would have to either widen their focus beyond the interests and sensibilities of white conservatives, or relinquish power, neither of which are they willing to do. They are determined to transform the political system in a way that would allow them to hold on to power without majority support, even against the explicit desire of a growing numerical majority of the electorate. It is imprecise to say that conservatives are turning their backs on democracy. Rather than suddenly going from "pro-democratic" to "anti-democratic," they have been fairly consistent: on board with a restricted version of democracy, but determined to prevent multiracial pluralism.

The central conflict on the Right revolves around the question of how far they can and must go to preserve the "natural" order. Some parts of the Right were never content with accepting the post-1960s reality and railed against what they saw as the acquiescence and appeasement of the forces of multiracial pluralism. Until recently, the established story of modern conservatism's emergence insisted that those far-right forces had been marginalized, confined to the irrelevant fringe, by the gatekeepers of the "respectable" Right. However, as the latest historical scholarship convincingly argues, rightwing extremism was never fully purged from mainstream conservatism.[10] And after Obama was elected president, the idea that Republicans were selling out "real" America, that more drastic action was urgently needed, was spreading fast into the center of conservative politics. In this view, Liberals were winning, destroying the country, and Republican appeasement was complicit.

The infamous "Flight 93" essay, for instance,

which rightwing intellectual Michael Anton published shortly before the 2016 election, provides the clearest articulation of this worldview.[11] Anton presented Hillary Clinton and the Democratic Party as a fundamental threat to America, every bit as dangerous as the terrorists who hijacked four airplanes on September 11, 2001. He called on the Right to embrace Trumpism because Trump would be willing to go much further to stop this "Un-American" threat than any of the "ordinary" Republicans who were "merely reactive" and for whom Anton had nothing but contempt. Since Trump wasn't bound by norms, traditions, or precedents, he alone could be counted on to do whatever was necessary to fight back against the "wholesale cultural and political change" – to "charge the cockpit," in Anton's crude analogy, like the passengers of Flight 93 who thwarted an attack on the Capitol. As Anton put it, "Trump…has stood up to say: I want to live. I want my party to live. I want my country to live. I want my people to live." Democracy? Who cares about democracy when "real America" is under assault and about to be overrun by radical, "Un-American" leftist forces?

The central fault line on the Right is thus not simply between democracy and authoritarianism. The key conflict is between those who want to uphold white Christian elite rule from within the confines of a narrowly restricted version of democracy – and those who want to pursue that goal by openly embracing authoritarianism and militant extremism.

V

Reactionary movement and parties across the "West" and beyond are laser-focused on the situation in the U.S., which they perceive as a window into a future they don't like, in which the forces of multiracial pluralism – roundly derided as "radical leftism" and "wokeism" – have already been allowed to advance too far. They rejoiced in 2016, because they saw the election of Donald Trump as proof that the forces of reaction would ultimately prevail. Trump, in this interpretation, was seen as evidence that any attempt to install multiracial pluralistic democracy would spark a

backlash strong enough to defeat the nefarious forces of liberalism – Trump was supposed to stem the tide.[12]

But Trumpism has – so far, at least – failed to make good on that promise. That's the reason why reactionaries are looking elsewhere. Many have become obsessed with Viktor Orbán in Hungary, who understands his appeal to the international reaction precisely and deliberately presents himself as the illiberal counter to the "leftist" assault.[13] None of the American conservatives and right-wingers who are incessantly professing their sympathy for Orbán seem to know much about his country. What matters to them is an imagined Hungary: a stronghold of white patriarchal Christianity, where men still get to be real men. They also love how autocrats like Orbán glorify their nations' past and forcefully push back against those cunning "globalists." To Western reactionaries, the imagined version of "Hungary" has become a model of how to organize society and deal with the "leftist" enemy.

Right-wingers everywhere understand the transnational dimension as well as the world-historic significance of the current fight over democracy more clearly than many people on the Left: Is it possible to establish a stable egalitarian, multiracial, pluralistic democracy? Such a political, social, and cultural order has indeed never existed. There have been several stable, fairly liberal democracies – but either they have been culturally and ethnically homogeneous to begin with; or they have been characterized by a pretty clearly defined ruling group: a white man's democracy, a racial caste democracy, a "herrenvolk" democracy. A truly multiracial, pluralistic democracy in which an individual's status was not determined to a significant degree by race, gender, religion, or wealth has never been achieved anywhere. It's a vision that reactionaries abhor – to them, it would be the end of "Western civilization." And they are determined to fight back by whatever means necessary. In many ways, the fate of democracy depends on whether or not enough people are as committed to defending democracy as the reactionary Right is to preventing it.

1. For bestselling examples of the "crisis of liberal democracy" discourse, see for instance Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, *How Democracies Die* (New York: Crown, 2018); Yascha Mounk, *The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It* (Cambridge: HUP, 2018); Anne Applebaum, *Twilight of Democracy: The Seductive Lure of Authoritarianism* (New York: Doubleday, 2020).

2. See for instance the discussion in "The United States is 'the oldest democracy' in the world," *PolitiFact*, 11 July 2016.

3. For a good, accessible overview of definitional questions see Sheri Berman, *Democracy and Dictatorship in Europe: From the Ancien Régime to the Present Day* (Oxford: OUP, 2019), 1-14.

4. Gary Gerstle, *American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: PUP, revised ed. 2017).

5. Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution 1863-1877* (New York: Harper, updated edition 2015); idem, *The Second Founding: How the Civil War and Reconstruction Remade the Constitution* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2019). On the successful post-Civil War attempts to restore white supremacy in the South see also Jefferson Cowie, *Freedom's Dominion: A Saga of White Resistance to Federal Power* (New York: Hachette, 2022).

6. See Martin Conway, *Western Europe's Democratic Age 1954-1968* (Princeton: PUP, 2020).

7. See Martin Klimke and Joachim Scharloth (eds.), *1968 in Europe: A History of Protest and Activism, 1956-1977* (Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2008); Carole Fink and others (eds.), *1968: The World Transformed* (Cambridge: CUP 1998); Samantha Christiansen and Zachary A. Scarlett (eds.), *The Third World in the Global 1960s* (New York: Berghahn, 2013).

8. See Angie Maxwell and Todd Shields, *The Long Southern Strategy: How Chasing White Voters in the South Changed American Politics* (Oxford/New York: OUP, 2019); Dan T. Carter, *From George Wallace to New Gingrich: Race in the Conservative Counterrevolution 1963-1994* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996).

9. Lawrence B. Glickman, *Free Enterprise: An American History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019).

10. See for instance Edward H. Miller, *A Conspiratorial Life: Robert Welch, the John Birch Society, and the Revolution of American Conservatism* (Chicago: UCP, 2022); Matthew Dallek, *Birchers: How the John Birch Society Radicalized the American Right* (New York: Hachette, 2023). See also Rick Perlstein, "I Thought I Understood the American Right. Trump Proved Me Wrong," *New York Times*, 11 April 2017.

11. Michael Anton, "The Flight 93 Election," *Claremont Review of Books*, 5 September 2016. For more examples of the rightwing siege mentality justifying anti-democratic radicalization see Glen Ellmers, "'Conservatism' is no Longer Enough," *The American Mind*, 24 March 2021 and John Daniel Davidson, "We Need to Stop Calling Ourselves Conservatives," *The Federalist*, 20 October 2022.

12. For an example of the continued fascination with Trump, see Katrin Bennhold, "Trump Emerges as Inspiration for Germany's Far Right," *New York Times*, 7 September 2020.

13. Elisabeth Zerofsky, "How the American Right Fell in Love with Hungary," *New York Times*, 19 October 2021.

The Impact of Climate Change on Arctic Indigenous Marine Food Security

Christopher Kiyaseh

Introduction

This paper will seek to analyze the relationship between climate change and marine food security of the indigenous Sámi in three counties of the Norwegian Arctic between 1994 and 2021. Climate change is operationalized as global natural gas output along with the environmental violations per country via the Environmental Justice Atlas (EJA). Sámi marine food security is operationalized as Atlantic salmon production loss, measured across three key indigenous counties of Norway: Troms og Finnmark, Nordland, and Trøndelag. Here, salmon is a foundational aspect of Sámi culture, identity, and livelihood.[1] It is also a severely understudied component of food security for the Sámi, as most of the scholarship is biased toward land-based agriculture and resources.

Preliminary findings indicate that climate change has a strong-negative relationship with Sámi marine food security, exponentially increasing overall food insecurity among Sámi populations, accompanied by losses of traditional hunting and gathering areas along with wildlife and indigenous knowledge. With the Arctic mean temperature rising approximately four times faster than the average global temperature, Arctic Sea ice is melting at an unprecedented rate of 13% per decade. As a result, researchers have indicated that the region could be ice-free by 2050.[2] With the ice disappearing, opportunities for natural

resource extraction and trans-Arctic shipping passages have become salient among the global community.

These opportunities have attracted great powers and multinational corporations alike, inducing a wave of "green colonialism" disguised as sustainable development and green infrastructure growth. Consequently, indigenous land and natural resources in the Arctic are under high risk of being seized as sacrifice zones[3]. These development projects, such as hydroelectric dams or nuclear small modular reactors (SMRs), often have hidden costs. For example, the expansion of harmful mining and refining of rare earth minerals, intensive land use, and displacement of indigenous people are all necessary components of installing renewable energy infrastructure.[4]

In sum, Sámi marine and land territories are experiencing disproportionate amounts of environmental damage, population displacement, and economic hardship under the pretense of saving the environment. As such, these nuances are complex, often misunderstood, and plagued by a lack of data, a common theme in the realm of indigenous marine food security. Therefore, to understand these complexities outlined above, this paper will be divided into four main sections: methodology and findings, discussion of findings, the politics of Sámi food security, and conclusion.

Methodology and Findings

Studying the Norwegian Sámi is essential to understanding greater indigenous Arctic peoples' marine food security. Their experience in using the resources of their environment can be used to better understand how to best adapt, conserve, or even develop approaches to ensure sustainable marine food security that benefits both humans and ecosystems. This case study employs Atlantic salmon production loss as the dependent variable, with natural gas output and environmental violations serving as independent variables.

Given this context, researching and understanding the practices of the Norwegian Sámi provides deep insight into cohesions shared between different indigenous communities in terms of their reliance on marine ecosystems for subsistence (salmon fishing). It also helps to inform us about the methods used by these communities — such as harvesting techniques and management regimes — that prove beneficial in maintaining a balance between human needs and environmental sustainability.

Atlantic salmon loss

To delve further into this topic, it is essential to look at both qualitative and quantitative methods available when studying the Norwegian Sámi community's marine food security. The main data was retrieved from the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries. Each respective county of the three chosen was selected due to its historical, cultural, and demographic aspects related to the Sámi people.[5]

Atlantic salmon production loss is recorded in thousands per unit of salmon between 1994-2021. Of the three counties, Troms og Finnmark recorded the highest count of production loss, with an average of ~6,979 per year. The highest losses on record for Troms og Finnmark were experienced in 2019 (~16,583), 2020 (~15,512), and 2021 (~12,918). Trøndelag saw an average of ~6,203 lost annually and Nordland, saw an average annual loss of ~5,473 per year. Overall, the three regions are experiencing a loss of ~18,654 Atlantic salmon per year, with each year's loss in production only increasing. Furthermore, comparing losses by decade 1994-2004 (~104,376) and 2005-2015 (~232,622), we can observe a more than 100% increase decade on decade. This trend implies that by 2026, we should expect a production loss of ~465,000.[6]

Environmental Justice Atlas

A multi-method approach is utilized to examine our explanatory variable, climate change. Climate change is operationalized by conducting a qualitative analysis of the litigation of environmental violations recorded by the

Environmental Justice Atlas, an online data platform that maps environmental inequality and injustices around the world. The platform offers access to information on the locations and causes of environmental injustices, allowing users to track the impact of human activities on natural resources and people's rights. The outcomes of these cases can be adjudicated at the international, national, and sub-national levels. Within the EJA, over 40 environmental violations were recorded in the Arctic region. A key finding within the analysis of the litigation is how violations are spilling over across countries and how they have significantly impacted the Sámi within the Troms og Finnmark region.[7]

Civil society groups in cooperation with the Sámi have been protesting heavy toxic emissions pollution from the Russian Norilsk-Nickel company's nickel plant in Kirkenes, Norway. These emissions contain high levels of sulfur dioxide and heavy metals, creating a health hazard for residents and contaminating their main water resources. Both the Norwegian and Russian governments remain silent on the matter. Despite significant organized protests from the Sámi, emissions continue to impact the quality and health of Atlantic salmon species and contributed to the production loss.

The harms of natural gas

Norway is the largest producer of natural gas in Europe, second only to Russia. It is also a significant energy commodity, as global annual emissions have been increasing each year by an average of 33 billion tons.[8] Natural gas is often referred to as a "bridge fuel" because it can provide energy in the short-term while renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind, are being developed. But this overlooks the fact that natural gas production and combustion still produce greenhouse gasses, including CO_2 and methane, leading to increased air pollution in Norway.[9] Burning gas emits toxins and particulates into the atmosphere, which then enter the bodies of water. These pollutants negatively affect the surrounding ecosystems, endangering the health of the Sámi's primary marine food source, the Atlantic

salmon, by accumulating in the fatty tissue of the fish, introducing further risks to the Sámi who consume them. This can result in forced displacement and migration of Sámi peoples in search of non-contaminated food sources.[10]

Discussion of findings

The findings within this paper are critical to expanding the scholarship on Sámi marine food security and implications for overall indigenous marine food security in the Arctic. However, it is to be acknowledged that these findings come with limitations. One of the main limitations of this analysis is the variety of data. For example, the data and findings regarding the lost Atlantic salmon production can be improved by incorporating other indigenous groups throughout the Arctic. Including more varied data would help support the external validity of this case study while also strengthening the base of knowledge from which it draws.

Another challenge comes from a lack of co-production of knowledge with Sámi. Co-producing knowledge with indigenous peoples on research regarding indigenous marine food security is vital as it ensures that their perspectives, needs, and concerns are heard, respected, and valued. An increasingly localized research agenda helps to create more accurate and equitable knowledge production processes, ensuring that the research is relevant and appropriate to the needs of the indigenous communities and will yield more accurate and meaningful results.[11] In addition, this allows for a better understanding of the complex relationship between traditional knowledge, marine ecosystems, and human health, leading to more effective strategies to manage fisheries and provide food security for indigenous populations sustainably.

Beyond the limitations of this analysis, the findings indicate a need for increased visibility and consistent measurement of indigenous people's food security. Therefore, an actionable policy tool would be to create an Arctic Indigenous Food Security Index (AIFSI). The AIFSI should be led by Arctic indigenous people

and be utilized to analyze the effectiveness of policies and programs implemented to support food security needs. This could be done by looking into the implementation of programs, monitoring compliance, and assessing the extent to which government policies and initiatives are being effectively disseminated and used. Such proactive information can support advocacy efforts to rally around policies needed at the local or international level that solidify indigenous people as equal citizens of their respective states.

The Politics of Sámi Food Security

The impacts of climate change on Norwegian Sámi food security have been significantly overshadowed by Arctic geopolitics.[12] Recent Arctic scholarship has focused on the threat of China and securitized climate change, energy, and natural resource extraction. In addition, the War in Ukraine continues to capture resources from all actors, further delineating the cost of great power conflict.

The lack of data and research regarding the indigenous Sámi in Norway results in an environment of invisibility, where Sámi grievances are ignored by the Norwegian government and the greater scholarly and international communities. Significant negative impacts such as reduced political agency, weakened democratic representation, and erosion of Sámi territorial rights to natural resources have been experienced as a result of this dynamic. Although the Sámi have a robust and independent parliamentary body, they are often overruled by the national government.[13]

The Sámi political and social identity is strongly tied to their territory and natural resources; therefore, the dispossession of that territory is akin to depriving them of their political and social will. It further undermines Sámi coalition building across regions by raising political barriers through physical installments. Two clear examples among many can be found in the 1979 Alta Power Station controversy and the 2021 Fosen Vind farm ruling. In both cases, the Norwegian government had built their renewable energy infrastructure, overruling

Sámi political representation and identity.[14]

The impacts of climate change have further compounded these challenges by creating a power imbalance between the indigenous Sámi and the Norwegian government. This power imbalance can be understood as a 'banker education' system for solving climate change and mitigating food insecurity. The 'banker system' of education is an educational framework that seeks to deposit knowledge into the learner from the teacher without allowing any participation from the student.[15] In this system, the teacher is viewed as the all-knowing, authoritarian 'banker,' and the student is seen as a mere receptacle who passively receives the deposit of knowledge from the instructor. This system denies the 'student,' or in this case, the Sámi people, any active participation in their learning, as the responsibility for attaining knowledge is placed solely on the teacher. With the 'banker system,' there is an implicit assumption that knowledge is simply a static, unchangeable object to be dissected, manipulated, and subsequently mastered. This pedagogy ultimately fails to consider the fact that knowledge is founded upon the meaning-making capabilities of students, where it is actively constructed through exploration and dialogue between student and teacher.

The 'banker education' system is exemplified in the Norwegian government's continued use of natural gas by the Norwegian government and the unwanted construction of green technology on Sámi rivers and land. Widespread protests have been ongoing against the Norwegian government for the construction of wind turbines on Sámi reindeer pastures. The Norwegian government has been quoted labeling the building of these wind turbine farms as a "human rights violation," but continues to advocate for misguided solutions despite their visible impacts.[16] This technology comes in the form of hydropower, an imperfect form of renewable energy because of the ecological destruction it causes.

For example, the Alta Hydroelectric Power Station located in Troms og Finnmark county

was responsible for an ~80% decrease in juvenile salmon densities.[17] The station was constructed despite persistent opposition from the Sámi. This reduction resulted in a ~16% drop in overall Atlantic salmon production.[18] Economic systems are imposed upon traditional cultures through 'green' initiatives such as fisheries' management plans that in some cases privilege extensive industrial trawling over small-scale artisanal methods employed by generations of local fishers. These actions lead to an erosion of traditional knowledge and practices, which can further marginalize vulnerable communities.

In 2017, for example, the Finnish and Norwegian governments revoked a majority of Sámi fishing rights along the Tana River. This resulted in exclusive access to traditionally shared resources awarded only to larger operators with more capital-intensive vessels. These changes pushed out the Sámi completely from their livelihood base, especially those without motorized boats who relied on smaller craft guided more closely by localized knowledge.[19]

These changes have had devastating consequences, leading directly to food insecurity and adverse health outcomes. The ability to freely collect what they need is being taken away from them due not only to the lack of legal recognition, but also because access to those resources is increasingly restricted in many ways. The Norwegian government has imposed availability limits under the guise of sustainability regulations, misaligned with traditional practice objectives.[20]

Further discussion on the intricate relationship between observed environmental changes like the loss of Atlantic salmon must be highlighted in relation to indigenous food sovereignty and security. Furthermore, a great deal of data is lacking on traditional Sámi knowledge related to territorial sovereignty and how it can be used as a tool for coalition building. What is most surprising is the lack of a novel Arctic indigenous food security index, one which focuses on marine and land-based sources related to Arctic indigenous people. It often is the case that developed countries like Norway

receive high scores for food security and often dismiss the existence of food insecurity among the Sámi and other indigenous populations. This is a significant gap that must be covered and researched further.

Conclusion

This analysis has focused on highlighting the strong negative relationship between climate change and Norwegian Sámi food security in the Arctic. It also discussed the cycle of climate change and green colonialism as a positive feedback loop with detrimental effects on Sámi food security and, by virtue, territorial sovereignty. This contributed to the already significant power disparities between the Sámi and the Norwegian government, based on the banker education system that prioritizes energy efficiency and profit over Sámi culture, health, resources, and survival. In this sense, the Norwegian government has underlined their true feelings towards the Sámi as another expendable resource meant to compensate for their contribution to climate change.

The lack of visibility regarding the status of Sámi food security exacerbates the view of their expendability. To overcome these challenges, the AIFSI will be a necessary tool for Sámi and Norwegian policymakers to communicate the true severity of food insecurity on the ground. The AIFSI also acts as a tool for Sámi self-determination and allows them to build coalitions geared towards greater territorial and food sovereignty. These coalitions would help reduce the power imbalance and put governments under pressure to reflect on the environmental destruction they have perpetuated. The AIFSI will also allow legislators to attack food insecurity in a way that involves Arctic indigenous people across all sectors of government and science in an empowering light. Future research must focus on conducting field research alongside the Norwegian Sámi on the expansion of the AIFSI. In addition, designing surveys that ask what components of the AIFSI would be most beneficial to the Norwegian Sámi can create a baseline for eliciting responses from other Arctic indigenous peoples. Within the

surveys, multiple rounds should be conducted, each with a distinct thematic focus such as culture and food security, health and food security, or any other topics deemed imperative to research further. Additional research should also explore how indigenous dietary needs are impacted by changes in migratory patterns of wildlife due to shifts in temperature or warming permafrost affecting fish spawning grounds.

Additionally, researchers could quantify the impacts that dramatic reductions in sea ice have had on subsistence hunting patterns – such as decreasing access time or heightened risk during food gathering – along with exploring strategies for mitigating these risks through technological adaptation or policy measures at local levels. The impact of rapid economic development from activities such as resource extraction also needs more attention from researchers concerning its potential ramifications on culturally important vegetation and animal species vital for sustenance living; this knowledge could then inform policy recommendations that advocate for positive environmental stewardship within an Arctic context vulnerable to globalization pressures. Lastly, qualitative studies designed with a participatory community approach could document different stories relating to how communities are affected by changing environments through interviews directly conducted within those contexts; this kind of information can offer important insight into adaptive methodologies used by different communities across diverse landscapes.

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Appendix

Figure 1: Losses in the production of Atlantic salmon by county (1994-2021)

Figure 2: Global Annual Emissions in billions of tons(C02) 1994-2021

Eco-Authoritarianism or Eco-Democracy?: Examining the Success of Nicaragua and Costa Rica's Climate Change Efforts

Natalie Chaudhuri

Introduction

They are a tale of two countries: one has descended into authoritarianism and the other is one of the healthiest democracies in Latin America. Though Nicaragua and Costa Rica are both small Central American countries committed to renewable energy and fighting climate change, their differing political systems mean differing results for their sustainability efforts. This paper analyzes both countries' histories of renewable energy and how their respective political systems have affected their climate change policies. First, I provide context for how climate change has and will continue to affect Central America. I then examine the contemporary sustainability initiatives in both countries. Finally, after outlining the current levels of democracy in each country, I show how these political systems impact the countries' initiatives. Ultimately, this paper argues that Costa Rica's democracy is a more robust model for fighting climate change than Nicaragua's authoritarian-driven efforts. Information transparency, civil society engagement, and international partnerships affect societies' abilities to combat climate change, all of which are more prevalent in the democratic model. Thus, countries have the choice to become democratic and pick the best of times, or choose authoritarianism and beget the worst of times.

Climate Change in Central America

In the past year, Central America has faced natural disasters in the backdrop of an unprecedented global pandemic, the frequency of which will only be exacerbated by climate. According to the Global Climate Risk Index, Nicaragua is the fourth most at-risk nation for climate change.[1] In 2020, Hurricane Eta affected over 1.8 million Nicaraguans and destroyed over 4,000 homes, devastated crops, and prevented over 50,000 Nicaraguans from accessing safe drinking water.[2] Two weeks later, Hurricane Iota made landfall, cutting off electricity and drinking water[3] and prompting landslides and flooding due to over 30 inches of rainfall.[4] Nicaraguans already face great threats to safety and health because of the country's vulnerability to natural disasters; however, as climate change continues, these dangers will only compound.

Similarly, Costa Rica is "prone to earthquakes, landslides, floods, and even tsunamis."[5] Hurricane Otto hit the country hard in 2016, with flooding that left thousands homeless and resulted in around $21 billion in damage.[6] Otto was followed by explosions of the Turrialba Volcano, which led to ashfall in major cities that significantly damaged the country's tourism and agricultural sectors.[7] Hurricane Matthew occurred soon after in October of 2016, prompting evacuations, property damage, and accidents from flooding due to overflowing rivers.[8] Finally, as in Nicaragua, Hurricanes Eta and Iota caused flooding and landslides that decimated homes and infrastructure in the country, exacerbating the COVID-19 pandemic as thousands of displaced people concentrated in overcrowded shelters with impaired health capabilities.[9]

Beyond natural disasters, these two countries suffer from deforestation. According to Our World in Data, Nicaragua's forests have shrunk at an annual rate of 2.56% between 2015 and 2020.[10] Nicaragua is home to the highest level of deforestation in Latin America, with its Bosawas Rainforest second in size in the

Americas only to the Amazon Rainforest, but disappearing at a faster rate.[11] Deforestation has led to deteriorating water quality and the destruction of shelters for the animals in the area, such as jaguars and macaws.[12] Similarly, Costa Rica's cloud forests are under attack from deforestation.[13] Even though Costa Rica is small, it makes up about 5% of global diversity, emphasizing the importance of its forests and species.[14] Thus, deforestation is causing both economic and ecological harm.

Because both countries' economies are largely dependent on agricultural exports and tourism, they are especially vulnerable to environmental changes. Climate change is also likely to drastically increase the number of refugees from the two countries. Costa Rica is already a major hub for refugees from Nicaragua, with more than 22,000 Nicaraguans requesting asylum to their neighboring country in 2021.[15] However, just as the recent hurricanes led to homelessness, climate change could result in refugees needing to flee both countries to escape flooding and landslides. UNHCR projects that natural disasters, limited natural resources such as water scarcity, and agricultural destruction wrought by climate change could result in more refugees and internally displaced people.[16] As Costa Rica and Nicaragua are neighbors, their fates against climate change are intertwined.

Sustainability Initiatives

Both Nicaragua and Costa Rica are at significant risk for climate change and future environmental challenges, and are actively responding and seem to remain committed to sustainability. Over half of Nicaragua's electricity is produced by renewable energy sources[17] such as geothermal energy and wind turbines.[18] Nicaragua signed the Paris Agreement, received a leadership role in the Green Climate Fund, and received $116.6 million to finance projects to restore their rainforests.[19] Nicaragua also encouraged sustainability for its beef production, promoting waste management, continuous pastures, and reforestation to offset potential environmental risks.[20]

Although Nicaragua has made incredible progress in building sustainability efforts, Costa Rica's approach is far more productive. For one, 100% of the country's energy comes from renewable sources,[21] running seven consecutive years on more than 98% renewable energy.[22] Tourism is a major industry in the Costa Rican economy, but will likely be heavily impacted by climate change. The country has been encouraging ecotourism and reforestation, combining economic and sustainability efforts by advertising wildlife reserves, national parks, and reforestation activities.[23] Through both international partnerships and domestic initiatives, Costa Rica has been committed to combating climate change and improving sustainability in a variety of sectors.

Political Systems

Both countries' mechanisms for executing these efforts differ greatly because of their respective political systems. Nicaragua is essentially an authoritarian state, whose leader, Daniel Ortega was a guerrilla fighter who assumed control after the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua in the 1980s, returning to power in 2007 and ruling the country ever since.[24] With the 2021 re-election of Ortega — criticized by U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and others as an election lacking in legitimacy – the country has slowly trended towards authoritarianism[25] U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken claimed that "President Ortega and Vice President Murillo have failed to honor this commitment by preparing a sham election devoid of credibility, by silencing and arresting opponents, and, ultimately, by attempting to establish an authoritarian dynasty unaccountable to the Nicaraguan people."[26] According to the Human Rights Campaign, Ortega "has dismantled nearly all institutional checks on presidential power," such as constitutional checks banning him from re-election.[27] Ortega and his wife (who is also the vice president), Rosario Murillo, control every part of the government—the National Assembly, judiciary, armed forces, and police.[28]

President Ortega has also been gruesomely cracking down on opposition. His government

drew international attention in 2018 for killing and arresting protesters, with some subject to torture.[29] More than 88,000 Nicaraguans have since fled the country as refugees due to persecution and economic deprivation, mostly escaping to Costa Rica.[30] His administration continues to target journalists and erode the freedom of the press,[31] with pro-regime propaganda dominating the news.[32] More recently, the Ortega administration annulled the legal status of NGOs that have been critical of the president's handling of the COVID-19 pandemic,[33] only exacerbating the health situation.

In contrast, Costa Rica is a healthy democracy. The country was essentially a two-party system, with the National Liberation Party and the Social Christian Unity Party, but the election in 2018 secured the win for the Citizens' Action Party, opening the door to participation by other parties.[34] The winner of the 2018 presidential election, President Carlos Alvarado Quesada, took office with 61% of the vote.[35,36] Compared to Nicaragua, which has a freedom score of 19 out of 100,[37] Costa Rica has a score of 91 out of 100 because of its strong elections and the citizenry's robust freedoms of expression and association.[38]

Especially in comparison to Nicaragua, Costa Rica has a strong system of checks and balances, with constitutional checks and an independent judiciary.[39] Furthermore, civil liberties are robustly protected, as the country ranks first in Latin America on the World Press Freedom Index for its rich journalism.[40] Most notably, Costa Rica abolished its military in 1948, emphasizing its devotion to pacifism and international cooperation as well as allowing it to invest in social and health spending rather than defense spending.[41]

Costa Rica is also a leader in the region for human rights accountability. After the 2018 elections, Costa Rica took in refugees from Nicaragua fleeing Ortega's repression. All of these factors reflect how the country's democracy and commitment to civil rights have made it the very antithesis of its neighbor, as well as a more stable force in the region overall.

Effects of Political Systems on Climate Change Efforts

Nicaragua's and Costa Rica's political systems heavily impact their response to climate change, particularly through fostering dialogue about climate solutions and pursuing relations with the international community. In the aftermath of Hurricanes Iota and Eta, President Ortega called for regional and international cooperation against climate change, calling it a "global security issue."[42] At the same time, the country's political system made it a pariah in the international community, reflected by the United States' current sanctions and other countries' denunciations of the recent election.[43] President Ortega was initially critical of the Paris Climate Accords,[44] suggesting he would be unlikely to work well with allies in the fight against climate change. Ortega has also repressed some journalists, who then found it difficult to cover natural disasters, sometimes being turned away from where victims had gathered to mourn.[45] Without full transparency about the consequences of natural disasters, governments cannot provide sufficient aid and climate change prevention to mitigate the damages.

Additionally, the administration has sometimes turned a blind eye to environmental abuses, such as the regime's lack of accountability for illicit rainforest clearing.[46] Without strong democratic political structures, the regime has no oversight of environmental abuses. Environmental activists have also said that Ortega's domestic human rights abuses could threaten the country's status on the Green Climate Fund, demonstrating that a lack of democracy has repercussions for international climate change support.[47] The lack of a clear successor to Ortega as a result of his authoritarianism could also endanger the longevity of any climate change policies. Dictatorships can sometimes lead to centralizing combat against climate change, but they can also sometimes lead to a general sense of denial about the issue, all while isolating the allies necessary to confront the international problem.

On the other hand, Costa Rica emphasizes national cohesion and is a greater ally for

international cooperation against climate change. Costa Rica is much more receptive to international agreements than Nicaragua, and other countries have even praised its climate change efforts: in 2019, the country was named "UN Champion of the Earth."[48] The Executive Director of the UN Environmental Programme said, "Costa Rica has been a pioneer in the protection of peace and nature and sets an example for the region and for the world"[49] – a stark contrast to what can be seen under Ortega's administration in Nicaragua.

Through its sustainability initiatives, Costa Rica demonstrates that the leader of climate change efforts does not have to be an eco-fascist regime, but can instead be a strong democracy. Indeed, the country's democratic structure has facilitated its efforts to combat climate change. In discussing the country's Economic and Social Council, President Quesada described democratic dialogue as "a powerful tool to build agreements and move things forward while strengthening social cohesion."[50] This logic has applied to climate change, where the country's carbon neutrality strategy rests on bringing relevant stakeholders together, particularly those from the private and financial sectors.[51] Consequently, this paper argues that Costa Rica provides a better model for climate change efforts. In sum, though complete control over a country may seem better for sustainable initiatives to pass, the stability of Costa Rica's political system and its productive foreign policy means it is likely to have more success in fighting climate change in the long run compared to Nicaragua.

Conclusion

Not all authoritarian countries are like Nicaragua, and not all democratic countries are like Costa Rica. However, some elements of authoritarian governments–lack of transparency, fewer turnovers of public officials, and fewer international agreements – make climate change efforts even more difficult. Nicaragua has enshrined this type of governance, with President Ortega becoming a dictator more interested in retaining power than protecting

the rights of his citizens. In contrast, Costa Rica's democratic system fosters dialogue and international cooperation against this common threat. While both countries have made headway in sustainability initiatives, and both neighbors are at risk of the effect of climate change on natural disasters, deforestation, and climate refugees, their political systems represent contrasting mechanisms for achieving their goals. Though they are two tiny countries frequently overlooked in international studies, Nicaragua and Costa Rica are emblematic of some of the most important future challenges and solutions that the world faces. By learning from these examples, other countries in the region and other countries in the world with differing levels of democracy can decide how this tale will end.

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Gender, Climate Change, and Forced Migration in Kiribati

Kara Joyce

Forced migration and climate change both have gendered impacts, and any plans or policies must account for the differing needs of men and women to successfully mitigate social inequality and suboptimal outcomes. This process is occurring in Kiribati right now, and it serves as a valuable case study applicable to many other island nations in the future. This essay will discuss Kiribati's existing gender roles, its steps towards gender-sensitive planning, and the impact of political changes on strategy implementation, focusing on the double threat women face from both climate change and forced migration.

Climate Change, Forced Migration, and Gender

One of the most pressing challenges of the twenty-first century is climate change, which has the destructive potential to uproot millions of citizens and cause billions of dollars of property damage. Climate change also acts as a force multiplier: states that already experience poverty and food and water insecurity will find their circumstances worsened by extreme weather events and more intense temperatures.[1] The impacts of climate change, however, are not gender neutral. Women are more at risk for multiple interlinking reasons.[2]

People experiencing poverty are more susceptible to the impacts of climate change because they do not have the resources necessary to escape or adapt to floods and other natural disasters, the frequency of which are increasing due to climate change. Women and children make up the majority of people living in "unacceptable poverty" and therefore are more likely to be victimized by climate events.[3] Because women are traditionally the labor source for unpaid domestic work, they have less time to pursue revenue-generating jobs and cannot access the education or funds that may help them prepare for or mitigate the impacts of climate change.[4] Climate change exacerbates the disparities between men and women and will continue to do so until states take transformative action.

Forced migration, which has a variety of sources including climate change, is also an increasingly feminized issue.[5] In some regions, up to 80%

of internally displaced people are women and children.[6] The roots of this disparity are complex and context-specific, but common causes include gendered differences in mobility, gendered domestic responsibilities for children and the elderly, and gendered roles in conflict, where men are more likely to have been forcibly conscripted or killed by combatants.[7] Once displaced, women face unique vulnerabilities and threats. Rates of sexual and gender-based violence increase during conflict, leading to health complications, traumatization, and social stigma.[8] Because women take the primary caregiver role for children and elderly family members, they face increased responsibilities with decreased resources during forced migration.[9]

As the impacts of climate change continue to disrupt the world, the number of people forced to migrate will increase. On average, more than 20 million people are internally displaced by environmental factors every year.[10] The World Bank predicts that this number may increase to up to 200 million individuals globally by the year 2050.[11] However, the legal status of and protections for this population are murky. Most climate migrants become internally displaced persons, or IDPs, and those who become international migrants are not legally recognized as refugees, barring them from accessing refugee rights and resources.[12] This lack of legal refugee status creates additional vulnerabilities for women – they may be sent back to their home countries, where they become internally displaced persons anyway,[13] or forced into refugee camps, where they may be subject to sexual violence, human trafficking, and other inhumane conditions.[14] Due to the compounded issues outlined above, women face double victimization from becoming environmental migrants. States need gender-sensitive policies to prevent reductions in women's safety and development, continue to promote women's economic and social freedoms, and adequately prepare their entire citizenry for climate change adaptations.

Kiribati: A Case Study in Climate Adaptation

Kiribati is a small island nation in the Pacific. It comprises 33 islands, 20 of which are inhabited. This nation faces significant challenges from climate change: not only do rising sea levels threaten its very existence above water, but changes in weather patterns and ocean health threaten an already underdeveloped nation with food insecurity, water insecurity, and decreases in arable land.[15] The former president of Kiribati, Anote Tong, worked on the international stage to encourage wealthier countries — primarily responsible for the greenhouse gas emissions that are causing these issues — to pay attention to and support Pacific island nations through immigration programs, financial assistance, and curbing emissions. Tong's efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, with Kiribati and other nations now forced to plan for their eventual displacement on their own.[16]

The forced migration situation of the Kiribati population is uncommon: unlike during situations of conflict displacement, the government of Kiribati has years to plan for the future of its people. Instead of responding to a crisis as it unfolds, Kiribati has time to combine its development goals with its climate change mitigation strategy. Due to political instability, however, even gender-sensitive plans may falter, with women paying the price.

First, this paper will discuss existing gender roles in Kiribati and how they impact climate mitigation and development efforts. Then, it will compare Kiribati's two most recent strategies for development and adaptation. Finally, it will consider the potential success of these two strategies in the face of political upheaval and what other islands may learn from this situation.

Gender Roles in Kiribati

Gender roles in Kiribati, while varying slightly from island to island, tend to be patriarchal. Men act as the head of the household and are primarily responsible for fishing and construction work, while women are responsible for domestic duties. Both genders participate in

agriculture, but men are in charge of resources and their usage.[17] Women face gender-based violence and are vulnerable to physical and sexual violence from their partners. Nearly half of women report unmet family planning needs.[18] Because Kiribati customs and traditions are constitutionally protected but discrimination against women is not legally prohibited, women have no legal recourse when customary or traditional behavior infringes upon their rights and freedoms.[19] Because women are underrepresented in political decision-making and men hold the majority of economic power, Kiribati women are especially vulnerable to climate change and forced displacement.[20]

Climate Migration, Development, and Political Struggle in Kiribati

The past two presidential administrations in Kiribati demonstrate the impact that political turnover can have on long-term planning, especially in meeting women's needs. The former president of Kiribati, Anote Tong (2003-2016), pioneered the idea of "migrating with dignity."[21] He purchased 22 kilometers of arable land in Fiji and planned for the entire population of Kiribati to be moved and upskilled to build new lives as good as or better than their previous ones, all while their ancestral home sunk beneath the waves.[22] After Tong retired, the new president, Taneti Maamau (2016-present), put these plans aside and instead created the *Kiribati 20-Year Vision (2016-2036)* plan, designed to achieve economic development through fishing and tourism while adapting to climate change on the islands through sea walls, land reclamation, and moving people out of flooding areas into other locations.[23] Both plans, in their own ways, hoped to account for the needs of women: Anote Tong was an ardent supporter of women's rights and representation despite pushback from his parliament,[24] and the Maamau plan promises to "underscore equity in all the sector programmes and projects to be implemented" to improve the standard of living of all citizens, with foci on women, youth, and people with disabilities.[25]

Both strategies had strengths: planning for migration by purchasing arable land and negotiating to ensure immigration opportunities to developed nations would mitigate many migration issues for both men and women, and a gender-sensitive national economic development plan is inherently a good thing. But a plan is only as good as its execution, and there is no guarantee that President Maamau's plan will be seen to completion; because of Kiribati's term limits, it will rely entirely on the administration that succeeds him. Kiribati is also in the middle of a constitutional crisis: Maamau's government tried to deport an Australian-born high court judge, who is married to the leader of the opposition party. When the court of appeals struck down the deportation, the government suspended all judges from its appeal and high courts.[26] Former president Tong described Maamau's recent actions as "unprecedented" and representing a slide towards authoritarianism.[27]

Should Maamau be replaced as president, the new president will have their own ideas about the future of Kiribati and steer the nation in that direction. In the midst of this upheaval and uncertainty, with neither plan being seen through to completion, women will bear the brunt of both the climate impacts on the islands and the stress of displacement.

Concluding Thoughts and Lessons Learned

When political upheaval disrupts a long-term strategy, no matter how gender-sensitive the plan is, the vulnerabilities women face due to their position in society will be exacerbated in the face of conflict or disaster. In the case of the women of Kiribati, the lack of access to resources, education, and political power will deepen the harm they face as the ocean rises and drinking water becomes increasingly scarce. The most important lessons for other nations facing imminent climate-related migration are threefold. First, a plan is only as strong as its implementation. Nations should institutionalize a long-term plan as much as they can for its impacts to outlive its administration. Second, policymakers should consider their successors when planning for the future: a collaborative effort with compromises may have a longer life and a stronger impact than one made by just one

party. One potential option, piloted in Germany, combines these two lessons by creating legally legitimate and participatory municipal advisory committees, which would include representatives from parties in government and local leaders.[28] These committees have helped to reduce conflict and ambiguity on climate change mitigation and adaptation in other contexts, and may help to implement the best of both Tong and Maamau's plans by decentralizing implementation responsibilities from the presidency towards individual island actors.[29] The third lesson is that wealthy nations cannot be relied upon to lessen their emissions levels quickly enough to change what is already in motion. Island nations and other low-lying states need both a domestic adaptation strategy to buy themselves time and a long-term exit strategy so that their citizens may become migrants with their dignity intact.

Climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies, like any long-term policy, require more than a year or two to become effective. As long as administrations start from scratch every election cycle, instead of continuing previous efforts, women will bear the brunt of the unmitigated consequences.

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Climate Change and Migration in Southeast Asia

Keven Hernandez

Introduction

Climate change carries the potential to dramatically impact security across human, national, and international spectrums. Other functional areas, such as health and biological security (prevention of disease or protection of natural biological agents in nature), will also be affected. These shocks will cause migration waves with political, economic, and social repercussions for nations in Southeast Asia. As a region of 640 million people, Southeast Asia faces acute challenges stemming from climate change that includes more frequent typhoons and floods, exacerbated by long coastlines that border low-lying areas with heavy population density, increased spread of tropical diseases (dengue and malaria), increased intensity and frequency of heat waves, and precipitous drops in rice yields.[1] The economic consequences would also be calamitous:

> The Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates Southeast Asia could suffer bigger losses than most regions in the world. Unchecked, climate change could shave 11% off the region's GDP by the end of the century as it takes a toll on key sectors such as agriculture, tourism, and fishing—along with human health and labor productivity—the ADB estimated in a 2015 report ...That's far more than its 2009 estimate of a 6.7 % reduction.[2]

Unfortunately, the track record of the West in assisting underdeveloped nations with climate change has been deficient, even as many in the region did not contribute to global warming as much as these richer nations have. This lack of assistance might seem easier to justify given that between 1990 and 2010, carbon dioxide emissions surged in Southeast Asia as more coal and fossil fuels were used.[3] But this pales in comparison to what the developed world has contributed historically to climate change. The U.S. has been the leading source of climate change in human history. But China is en route to pass it in 2050.[4] Since 2006, China has produced the most carbon dioxide annually, more than any other nation; 90% of its energy comes from oil, gas and coal, the latter emitting the "most carbon dioxide per unit of electricity generated..."[5]

Southeast nations did not have the opportunity to develop simultaneously with the West and are now catching up economically through any means necessary. In Indonesia, its energy market and resources will constitute a large portion of future economic growth that will mainly derive from coal, gas, and oil.[6] Its Minas oil field, for example, will omit considerable greenhouse gas emissions, but the developed world should consider how Indonesia and Southeast Asia could prosper while simultaneously combating global warming.[7] Minas, one of the largest oil fields in Southeast Asia, started production in 1952, but Indonesia only started to industrialize in the 1980s compared to the West which industrialized in the 19th century.[8] Indonesia will continue to burn coal and continue to produce and sell its gas and oil for its industrial growth and electricity generation. Rather than bar Indonesia and the region from future

compensation of any climate change bargain because of their reliance on these energy sources for economic development, the West should attempt to work with their needs.

At the same time, the transnational nature of global warming will accentuate security crises like never before, with migration being a core feature of its multitudinous consequences. The challenge for the West will be in balancing the region's economic development dependent on fossil fuels with the actual security consequences of climate-imposed migratory flows. According to one report, an estimated 1 billion people will be forced to migrate from climate and water-related contingencies.[9] The lack of data regarding how climate change will manifest itself in migratory patterns for the developing world, especially in Southeast Asia, will be an obstacle.[10] However, the contours of the challenge could at least be drawn to better conceptualize an appropriate schema to add a security dimension. The West needs to quickly take stock of how climate change will aggravate transnational security threats that, if allowed to fester, could have unpredictable political repercussions from the reaction of mass unorganized migration impacting developed countries.[11]

Transnational Security Threats Exacerbated by Climate Change

The transnational security crises emanating from climate change are manifold. Climate change is "a threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world."[12] New pandemics could be more probable as a result of deforestation that force many animals to migrate as a result of habitat loss, which could contribute to disease spread as this raises the level of contact between other animals and humans — issues that have a bearing on human security.[13] The wet markets of Southeast Asia, such as in Vietnam, are especially vulnerable to these dynamics, given how close they are to wildlife, which comes with the increased possibility of transmitting zoonotic diseases to humans.[14] Not only will climate change aggravate this further — with the degradation of health and biological security — but it will also be an

additive to the mixture of criminal elements in the region.

Deforestation is an example of how a problem regarded as an environmental concern can have effects that specifically harm civilian security, with perverse incentives for entrenched or even loose criminal organizations. In the Philippines in 2017, an unarmed task force formed to combat illegal logging was targeted by timber poachers.[15] Forty-six land and environmental defenders were killed in 2019 by illegal loggers (with some attributed perhaps to government security operations), primarily concentrated in the South of the country, where it is more restive due to communist and Islamist insurgencies.[16] Government workers, agricultural workers, farmers, forest rangers, and indigenous peoples have been killed in the past, according to Kalikasan PNE, an NGO that tallies the deaths.[17] The country has been labeled as the most dangerous nation for those that seek to protect the environment or land.[18] Deforestation is widespread in the region, especially in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand, with one of the highest losses in the world of 1.2% of its forests annually.[19] There is also a link between deforestation and extreme heat conditions.[20] For example, it has been discovered that increased temperatures "significantly increase the incidence of out-migration in rural provinces of the Philippines, most likely due to declines in agricultural productivity."[21] Climate change is a vicious cycle that creates and feeds off these impacts, affecting human security.

The proliferation and strengthening of various malevolent forces in Southeast Asia can also result in increasingly expansive drug organizations, transnational organized crime syndicates, and terrorist networks that can thrive in ungoverned and vulnerable spaces. Capturing these interacting forces will be challenging, all the more so because *sometimes* they will not seem to affect the other, when in fact they do.

Climate change will impact governance, agricultural communities, and shift structural conditions undergirding economies in Southeast

Asia that require proactive measures, even as no threat touched by or spurred by climate change can be predicted with certainty. Incorporating climate change-related functions into various international and national agencies will be necessary. INTERPOL will need to strengthen the methods by which they tackle environmental crimes and add more analytical capacities to understand how criminals will benefit from the socio-economic and political fractures emanating from global warming. Currently, INTERPOL has specialized crime working groups and an Environmental Crime Working Party, but depends on external financing and on "sustainable partnerships."[22] Integrating a security layer into discussions of how climate change can impact the prosperity and well-being of the citizenry will alter the conversation in a more productive direction. The challenge for the international community should be articulating a way to tie these security concerns to the broader problem of climate change and how it can affect migratory flows.

A New Way of Conceptualizing Climate Change

Solutions to climate change migration will have to marry smart policies by vulnerable nations with an equitable international regime that spurs developed nations to do their part. A few developments would need to occur in order for this international regime to be shaped and built. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), the United Nations' judicial body, has only provided an advisory opinion on a case regarding climate change.[23] Even as ICJ rulings are not binding, more aggressive climate change decisions could spur international action.[24] It then begs the question, do the nations in Southeast Asia have the legislative capacity to act on these rulings? These domestic regimes will need to be built as international law continues to be formalized. The lack of current legislative action among nations suggests an uncertain future, but with an international precedent, the incentives for domestic law regimes to sprout are increased. Developed nations should help set the international precedent by bringing to bear their advanced judicial systems to the issue by creating "legal" NGOs whose purpose would be assisting

nations in creating proper legal constructs based on rulings that protect migrants from climate change. For example, the European Court of Human Rights heard a climate change lawsuit for the first time that could have international ramifications. The plaintiffs have sued the Swiss government for violating their human rights by failing to act on climate change, suggesting the failure to tackle climate change breaches the rights protected by the European Convention on Human Rights." As the consequences of these rulings proliferate, Southeast Asian countries will need assistance adjusting their legal systems to accommodate them.

Ideally, nations would also implement an equitable administration of migratory flows both nationally and internationally. The creation of this regime is easier to conceptualize with an understanding of what is not necessarily proper, as the limits of which can help conceive of an equitable migratory regime. A proposal whereby the geographical distribution of migrants is the first consideration poses a set of issues. First, the uneven distribution of vulnerable populations does not allow for such a strict quota system. For example, those fleeing Northern Africa to Europe due to human precarity have inordinately impacted Italy and Greece the most.[25] Second, a regional action plan with migratory flows tethered to a specific hemisphere, such as vulnerable peoples from Latin America migrating to the United States or Canada would be unfair to Europe because it would take more migrants due to its geographical proximity to Africa and the Middle East. As such, this discredits a regime that only considers geographical quotas. A loose regime that incentivizes all developed countries to accept migrants will lessen the burden for specific countries on the frontline of the climate crisis. This would also obviate against dictating where migrants can migrate to, although there would be a backstop in case migrants favor a specific country that will not be able to accept so many refugees.

Considering these challenges, it could well be that any action plan will be inherently unfair to certain nations when it comes to

disproportionately or forcibly accepting migrants. Incentives and non-climate-related policies would need to be attached to any climate migration policy or could be handled separately after the fact. These can include financial reimbursements, stimulus packages, preference for green infrastructure investments, or relief of certain tax obligations. For example, the European Union could compensate those nations that naturally take in more migrants because of higher living standards even if some type of quota system is in place. Germany, France, or the United Kingdom could be given slight leeway when appropriating funds for any international climate initiative, such as for the UN Conference of the Parties (COP).

Furthermore, Western nations should provide training and institutional capacity building for Southeast Asia to develop human capital for dealing with the worst aspects of climate change disruption. A mass effort to educate people from the region on how to prepare, add resiliency to their way of living—especially for agricultural communities—and invest in on-the-ground research for local scientists can lessen the unpredictable nature of climate-driven vicious cycles. The UN's World Food Program presence at COP27 is a welcome step in this direction, but more forceful efforts at creating sustainable agricultural practices informed by science for those impacted now and in the future need to be considered. More resources and funding from climate pledges or other funds given to nongovernmental organizations that deal with environmental defense, pandemic preparedness, and human development will increase the expertise and toolboxes available for reinforcement learning among partner nations and organizations. The expansive threat of climate change will necessitate creating a network of like-minded organizations, like Forest Defenders Alliance, Greenpeace, Asia Pacific Adaptation Network, and C40 Cities, to combat the threat.

Lastly, collecting quantitative data to understand the problem in more depth will engender better solutions to manage the issue in Southeast Asia. Creating and linking data sets related to climate-driven events, such as migration, to information regarding transnational security threats will help create more precise solutions. Many open-source platforms exist, like the Mekong Dam Monitor, that monitors the dams and associated climate effects of the Mekong Basin. But more expansive platforms that include the entirety of the region and incorporate security dynamics will be needed to understand the problem fully. Modeling these effects and exploring them further in the political science literature could help convince national leaders to conceive of climate change as a comprehensive threat that could destabilize not only other societies but their own. In sum, a new way of conceptualizing how international climate regimes can be synchronized with domestic ones is becoming more urgent as climate change impacts the security of developed and developing nations alike, as millions of people will be forced to migrate elsewhere.

Conclusion

South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and the Pacific Islands are among the most vulnerable to the threat of climate change.[26] Were the developed world to finance climate reparations, more priority could be given to these regions. However, Southeast Asia's reliance on coal and fossil fuels to develop and expand their economies raises obstacles for already-developed Western nations looking to cut global emissions. These sentiments could be lessened by the inclusion of a security layer that considers the national interests of various nations suffering the consequences of transnational threats arising from global warming. Moreover, climate change is a challenge that touches upon every aspect of national security and can reinforce existing threats, such as food and housing insecurity, global health, and governance vacuums that will cause unpredictable migration flows. The chasm between how climate change will affect future migratory trends is an understudied topic, particularly in how it will impact human and international security.

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Fragmented Cosmopolitanism: Structural and Cultural Barriers to Foreign Talent Retention in Singapore and Dubai

Sooin Choi

Introduction

Human capital is often cited as a major factor that can help cities grow into knowledge economies.[1] In contrast to economies based on manufacturing or resource extraction, knowledge economies are driven by innovation, entrepreneurship, and research and development capacity. Around the world, governments put forth aggressive national strategies to foster knowledge economies.[2] Cities across the world compete over the best talent to build knowledge economies.

My article analyzes how some cities not only attract talent from abroad, but also succeed in retaining it. The focus on talent retention is important because cultivating long-standing cohorts of talented workers is crucial for innovation. The production of knowledge is a long-term process, and it requires workers who are dedicated to the ecosystem to run an innovative economy. In particular, I study Singapore and Dubai as attractive places for foreign talent to live, work, and play;[3] however, legal and socio-political constraints make the expatriate lifestyle even more transient. I ask: what are the barriers that foreigners experience that prevent them from being attached to the foreign hosts? In Singapore and Dubai, the experience of exclusivity often prohibits foreign talent from being localized. I argue that, in both cities, fragmented cosmopolitanism created by restrictive government policies and discriminatory cultural practices impacts the retention of foreign talent.

I use the term "foreign talent" to discuss a globally mobile, highly skilled workforce. Richard Florida explains that some cities are more effective at fostering an innovative, knowledge economy due to the *3Ts*: *talent, technology, and tolerance*.[4] The last *T,* tolerance, means talented workers choose to live in places that are open to a flow of new ideas, people, and lifestyles. It is the element of tolerance where I assert that Dubai and Singapore lag behind. Despite the diverse demographics in Singapore and Dubai, fragmented cosmopolitanism remains a challenge to creating a "tolerant" environment for migrants.

Appealing to foreign talent is important because relative to low-skilled workers, high-skilled foreign talent have greater agency in choosing where to relocate based on prospective lifestyles in host countries. In other words, employment

prospects may not be sufficient to persuade foreign talent to relocate, let alone stay long-term in the host countries, as Glaeser argues that cities need to become "urban theme parks" that support the lifestyles of smart, entrepreneurial workers.[5]

Why Singapore and Dubai?

The economies of Singapore and Dubai both depend on foreign labor. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, foreign laborers accounted for 38 percent of Singapore's workforce.[6] As for Dubai, the percentage of foreigners in the workforce is as high as 90 percent.[7] Both cities are ethnically diverse, and their cosmopolitanism is supported by majority English-speaking working populations. Diversity, however, in other ways of life is allowed to a lesser extent. In Singapore, the state mediates the use of public spaces through what is known as *gui ju.* Understood as a code of conduct that determines appropriateness of social behavior within public spaces,[8] gui ju standardizes social norms in ethnically diverse Singapore. Singapore is especially known for the state codifying and enforcing strict principles of social organization that shapes the everyday behaviors of its urban residents, producing Singapore's own urban habitus.

In the UAE, the official religion of the state is Islam, which contours how the Emirates are governed. While Dubai may be branded as one of the most religiously and socially liberal places in the Gulf, public morals and policy cannot be obstructed by foreign workers' personal religious and/or political beliefs. It is the duty of foreign workers to be cognizant of the cultural and legal restrictions in their day-to-day lives,[9] which varies in how it affects foreign talents' lives. Some may frown upon gender-segregated public spaces while others may protest the criminalization of homosexuality. These challenges, in addition to more trivial cultural differences, are what makes Dubai unique is the facade of tolerance and cosmopolitanism that is curated by the government. The presence of norms on social civility is not unique to Singapore and Dubai.

However, Singapore's stringent practice of *gui ju* and Dubai's comparative cultural conservatism add a layer of challenge for foreign talent when integrating into the local culture. While it can be viewed as a social responsibility of migrant workers, whether high- or low-skilled, to adapt to host countries' cultural and political contexts, foreign high-skill workers may practice more claim-making due to their higher social status. Singapore and Dubai are cases where, despite the level of multiculturalism that they have to offer, the government wields control over what is allowed within the host governments' frameworks of cosmopolitanism.

Singapore's Case Study

History of Migration

Geographically linked with China, South Asia, and the rest of Southeast Asian countries, Singapore has risen as an important trading port in the world. The absence of trade tariffs, an export-oriented economy, and a large amount of foreign direct investment further lubricated the process of Singapore's rise as a leading global economy. Historically, there has always been a large flow of people in and out of the city-state. During British colonialism, Singapore hosted European trading agencies and served as the West's connecting point to Far East Asia.[10] Similarly, modern Singapore is a peripheral Asian city that bridges the financial networks of the Asia-Pacific and those of Europe and North America.[11] In the mid-twentieth century, Singapore's population was largely based on the migration of people. Many who are known as Singaporean nationals now were those who settled as migrants in the mid-twentieth century and are ethnically Chinese, Malay, and Indian.[12]

From the early 1980s, the government has vested energy and effort into making the city particularly more attractive to foreign talent.[13] As the Singaporean economy evolved from export manufacturing to services that relied less on unskilled labor but more heavily on capital and technology, Singapore required skilled manpower.[14] The diverse demographics of Singapore, coupled with the government's

ambitions to attract the top global talent, has led to multiculturalism – though with political restrictions – as a core principle of Singapore's branding.

However, in recent years and prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Singaporean government has taken steps to reduce its dependence on foreign workers. For instance, Singapore reduced the number of S Pass visas for mid-level skilled laborers by five percent, starting in January 2021.[15] While this policy mainly targets mid-level professionals, whose requirement is to earn a minimum $2,400 SGD ($1,775 USD) monthly, it also signals that Singapore is no longer a policy-free haven for foreign professionals.

Structural Challenges: New Visa Rules

Singapore's increase in the minimum salary requirement to obtain a visa makes local candidates more attractive to hire than foreigners. Every time Singapore raises the minimum salary requirement, not only do companies have to ensure that they pay their new employees at least the minimum wage, but also increase the wage of existing foreign employees.[16] The government also dramatically reduced the number of work visas issued to foreign workers. In 2020, one-eighth of Singapore's foreign workers were laid off while Singaporean nationals received stimulus funding that cost the government a total of $74.2 billion.[17] During a global health crisis, foreign workers realized that their welfare can be sacrificed in exchange for protecting that of Singaporean citizens.[18]

Legal barriers implemented by the government are products of xenophobia that have escalated in Singapore's domestic politics. As a result, many foreign talents left the city-state: some not out of their choice, like when Chinese border controls intensified, versus others out of their own volition. In 2020, Singapore witnessed a population decline for the first time since 2003, partially due to COVID border controls.[19]

Cultural Challenges: Hostilities from the Locals

Despite such a demographically diverse and economically prosperous environment, Singapore has been struggling with building a strong national identity while maintaining a multicultural social fabric. There is increasing tension in Singapore about who belongs and who does not. These issues are contested along the lines of nationalism and citizenship, making Singapore a place that is both "diverse and divisive."[14] Foreigners and immigrants are often talked about as 'the other' who are not authentic to the national identity. Among many, new Chinese immigrants comprise the largest group of newcomers and are often subjected to the most discrimination.[20]

Competition over jobs drives locals' hostilities toward foreign talents. Singaporean nationals have also been critical of how foreign talent benefits more through Singapore's lax immigration policies while equally skilled locals struggle with unemployment challenges. Singaporean youths outside the job market internalize the same kind of threat from foreigners over university admittances.[21] The tension between national and foreign workers intensified during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic when unemployment rates soared, and virus outbreaks were rampant in foreign worker dormitories.[22]

As a result of the local-foreigner tension, Singapore's foreign talent has become more transient. One study found that many foreign talent respondents have expressed that while permanent residence can be a convenient way to ease their professional journey in Singapore, they still perceive Singapore as a temporary stop.[23]

Dubai's Case Study

History of Migration

Dubai sits between South Asia, the Persian/Arabian Gulf, and Iran, and enjoys easy access to the Indian Ocean trading routes that bridge

South Asia, the Middle East, and East Africa. Like Singapore, Dubai has always encountered challenges with labor shortages, especially for massive construction and development projects following the discovery of oil and economic boom. To compensate for its small national population, Dubai recruited skilled and unskilled talent from abroad. In the mid-1970s, the population of Pakistanis outnumbered the Emirati nationals in Dubai.[24] By the end of the 20th century, high-skilled works from the West began to see Dubai as an attractive destination.[25]

Today's Dubai prides itself on having a diverse demographic composition, with more than two hundred nationalities in the city.[26] The majority of the migrants, however, are in Dubai temporarily. Robert Manning and Peter Engelke describe Dubai as "an example of high global flow but low attachment to place."[27] They find that Dubai's shortcoming of not being able to have foreign talent become attached to the city can be a challenge in developing Dubai into a knowledge economy.

Structural Challenges: Legal Barriers and Passport Politics

To protect the welfare of the Emirati citizens, Dubai practices the *kafala* system, which mandates all foreigners to have an Emirati citizen sponsor their stay. In this system, most middle and upper-class foreign talent are on three-year, renewable residency visas that can be revoked at the discretion of the government or the sponsoring Emirati. Additionally, concepts of permanent residency or second-generation expatriates do not exist – even if a child is born in Dubai, their place of birth does not inalienably confer them the right to have permanent residence or citizenship.[28] Even without expects of obtaining citizenship upon entering the UAE, the legal barrier causes an incomplete sense of belonging.

Syed Ali, in his book, shares an account of a young foreign worker from India named Prince who expressed "in some sort of subconscious level that you aren't safe here…It's that you can't

make this your home."[29] In the same chapter, Ali juxtaposed Prince's experience against another foreign worker Hasan who had a rare fortune to obtain his permanent residence in Dubai. After obtaining his permanent residence, he internalized a "sense of security, a sense of living in this place and wanting to contribute to its long-term prosperity."[30]

Prince's and Hasan's experiences inform how conferring a legal right of permanent residence has a significant impact on one's consciousness. Permanent residency can endow foreigners a sense of security and acceptance in society. In Hasan's case, it also provided him a motivation to contribute to Dubai's society. Both elements are critical in fostering one's attachment to the city and dedication to building its economy.

Dubai has been making efforts to nationalize its workforce instead of relying heavily on imported labor. Known as Emiratisation, it is part of a larger effort by the Emirati government to reduce their reliance on foreign workers by mandating companies to fulfill a quota of hiring domestic talents.[31] As entities in both public and private sectors abide by the quota requirements, job opportunities for foreigners are shrinking. The government, however, admitted that Emiratising their workforce will be a long process, and UAE still needs foreign workers to maintain the economy.[32] However, the present system of foreign workers needs to be re-envisioned as a long-term investment to build the foundations of a knowledge economy with highly trained foreign workers that feel invested and willing to stay long-term, ultimately contributing to the nationalization of Dubai's workforce.

Unlike Singapore, workforce localization was not implemented as a response to Emirati citizens' woes over employment. Rather, the government is attempting to motivate its own citizens to contribute to the workforce. Given the oil wealth, many Emirati citizens still have little financial incentive for career development.[33] Dubai's current band-aid solution was to introduce "green visas" that enable laid-off foreign workers

to pursue employment without sponsorship for 180 days.[34] While the new visa policy could aid foreign talent in feeling more secure, Emiratisation will, slowly but surely, continue to affect the employment of foreign talent as UAE slows down the inflow of outside labor.

Cultural Challenges: Racial Enclaves and Gender Discrimination

Like many Gulf cities, Dubai has a discriminatory salary practice whereby they provide different salaries to people based on their passports, contributing to the formation of racial consciousness in the city. Dubai is often dismissed harshly as a socially segregated space with residents of Emirati national and foreigners living in almost separated worlds.[35] While acknowledging the benefits of having access to communities of shared backgrounds, the formation of ethnic cliques can exacerbate the feeling of discrimination internalized by those who are also put at a salary disadvantage. Consequently, for these groups, Dubai's milieu can seem divisive.

Furthermore, Dubai is a male-dominated society by both population numbers and culture; about 75 percent of Dubai's population is male.[36] Dubai is also a Muslim society where it is expected that women comply with local norms of modesty in public spaces, determining appropriate dress code and demeanor. Gender consciousness also applies to workplaces and is often reinforced by lower compensation and benefits provided to female workers. Foreign and female workers in Dubai face discriminatory practices at work with fewer benefits, lower salaries, less job security, and more scrutiny of their public demeanor.[37] Opportunities for mixed-gender interactions are oftentimes restricted in public social settings. While this is more acutely expected of Emirati women by their compatriots, foreign women also feel the pressure to be respectful of the local culture of modesty.[38] Female foreign talent may feel more alienated in Dubai, which may impact whether to relocate and/or settle in Dubai long-term.

Conclusion

I examined the cases of Singapore and Dubai to analyze what each of their shortcomings are in retaining foreign talent in their ultimate goals of growing a knowledge economy. I divided the challenges each city faces into structural and cultural categories and determined potential areas of improvement. In a way, Singapore's conditions stand as an opposing case to Dubai's. Whereas Singapore offers the option for its foreign talent to apply for permanent residency, its hostile cultural environment discourages foreign talent from doing so. Therefore, in Singapore's case, the impact of cultural barriers trumps that of structural factors. In contrast, in Dubai, structural limitations have a larger effect on foreign talent's willingness to stay. While cultural factors do affect foreign talent's attachment to place, the legal restrictions of not being able to pursue permanent residency and living under the full discretion of the Emiratis are what shape foreign workers' chronic sense of insecurity. Both environments may lose the grip of their most wanted talent if these restraints affect the lifestyle, autonomy, and sense of belonging of the foreign talent. Despite the cultural difficulties and legal constraints, there are still many low- and high-skilled migrant workers who stay in Singapore and Dubai for generations. For some, the longevity in cities can foster a sense of belonging; yet the legal and cultural barriers identified in the paper may stand in the way of others from staying.

Singapore and Dubai each have their own unique challenges balancing multiculturalism, migration, and national identity. While both societies operate differently from advanced democracies of North America and Western Europe, their intention to cultivate tolerant, cosmopolitan societies are no less genuine. In fact, the pushback from globalization and implementation of stricter control over high-skilled labor migration are emerging trends not only in cities around the Indian Ocean, such as Singapore and Dubai, but also in North America and Europe. The lack of cultural tolerance, at times manifested through racial

hate or religious discrimination, is experienced by the immigrants to the "West." Singapore and Dubai are two cases where the free flow of labor has been compromised, and the encroaching culture of intolerance has been further impacting foreign talent retention negatively. Both advanced democracies and authoritarian regimes should consider how reducing the flow of labor and failing to cultivate a tolerant society can hold a city from building a robust innovative economy, powered by minds from all walks of life.

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The Cooptation of Lower and Lower-Middle Class Issues in Democratization Movements Can Lead to Democratic Backsliding: A Case Study Using South Korea

Hadley Spadaccini

Introduction

Scholars often investigate the groups to which the elites and middle class belong in order to analyze the process of democratization, be those groups from civil society, social movements, the government itself, or some other form of identity.[1] Some scholars have asserted that societies without a bourgeois class do not democratize when they revolt against the government, instead becoming autocracies like China.[2] However, the lower socioeconomic classes in a society often feature prominently in democratization movements, often comprising a large portion of a movement's supporters. The roles and goals of lower socioeconomic classes are often ignored in democratization, crediting them to so-called middle class- or elite-driven democratization. This only further erroneously supports the idea that the mobilization of higher socioeconomic classes causes widespread governmental change.

Scholars, economists, and politicians frequently draw a link between democratization and the desire for greater economic opportunity, but there are notable exceptions to this hypothesis.[3] During the previous century, the primary way developing countries sought to increase economic opportunity was to open to global trade and adopt a more capitalist economic system in line with prevailing, Western-led global economic norms. While many countries that opened up to trade became democracies – such as Taiwan and South Korea – many did not – such as China and Vietnam. Notably, China has been called both an exception to and an example of structural, social, and economic approaches to democratization, effectively suppressing the influence of various movements that could have led to full democratization.[4] Such exceptions merit investigating whether democratization

is truly the end goal for lower socioeconomic classes or if economic development is the ultimate goal, regardless of how it is achieved. What differentiates analyses of communist movements like that of China is that scholars focus more heavily on the role played by the lower socioeconomic classes, contrasting with the often "Western" idea of bourgeois-led democratization. Focusing instead on lower socioeconomic classes in democratization movements is especially pertinent because the people belonging to these classes can be a driving force for democratic backsliding when the promises of democratization are no longer fulfilled.

I argue that the main problem of understanding the process of democratization is complicated by these two intertwined issues: 1) the cooptation of lower-class and lower-middle class issues by the upper-middle class in the early stages of democratization, and 2) globalization necessarily introduces a limit to the level of democratization that lower and lower middle classes will tolerate. Using examples primarily from South Korea, this paper investigates how lower and lower-middle class issues provide a foundation for higher socioeconomic classes to demand democratization, as well as for lower socioeconomic classes to initiate democratic backsliding.

Cooptation of Lower-Class Issues in Early Democratization

Starting in 1984, the Chun Doo-hwan government began the process of political liberalization by lifting existing bans on civil society groups, such as student, leftist, and dissenting political parties — *chaeya,* or literally "the forces out in the field" — believing the risk to the regime's power would be minimal.[5] These *chaeya* and the extant militant labor movement did, however, challenge the regime's power, setting South Korea on the path to democratization. GDP per capita had been increasing rapidly from Chun Doo-hwan's coup in 1979 until the start of political liberalization in 1984, rising from around US$1,715 (2023 dollars) in 1980 to US$2,413 (2023 dollars) in 1984, but working conditions

under the *chaebol* industry structure were grueling.[6] *Chaebol* refer to typically family-run conglomerates that have received preferential treatment and support from the South Korean government — Samsung, Hyundai, LG, and SK Hynix are all *chaebol*. In 1977, *The Washington Post* reported on the working conditions of one subject, Miss Lee, in a South Korean cloth factory that "illegally demands that she work nine or ten hours a day, and pays her no overtime. Until she and a group of friends engaged in some mild agitation, Miss Lee was forced to work seven days a week when her company had a backlog of orders."[7]

Before Chun Doo-hwan began the process of political liberalization, striking was illegal. When *chaeya* and worker groups began to protest following Chun Doo-hwan's 1980 coup, his government came down heavily on protesting groups. One of the most impactful and bloodiest of these crackdowns was the Gwangju Uprising. According to the Gwangju city government, "a total of 5,807 people are recognized as May 18 victims, including 155 deaths, 57 missing, 112 deaths following injury, 3,643 injured, 1,813 taken into detention, and others."[8] Student movements were largely forced underground by the crackdowns, which required them to take on a new strategy. Likewise, labor unions were heavily repressed with the August 1980 "Purification of Labor Unions," in which "the government dissolved 118 unions, and in September, it forced 191 union leaders to resign."[9] Underground student groups then started adopting Marxist and Leninist ideologies.[10]

As such, it became clear that democratization alone was no longer sufficient to address the grievances of these student groups. According to Joan E. Cho and Paul Y. Chang, student interest in the labor movement had existed in the 1970s, but it wasn't until the 1980s that students began to "drop out of universities in large numbers to work in factories in order to help politicize the labor movement."[11] Strategically, this made complete sense. Students — and other *chaeya* — could embed themselves into a labor movement that was much larger and historically already

very militant. The middle class was growing but still small at the time, and student groups evidently felt that uniting with lower-class laborers could provide support to their goals and put pressure on the government. The damage done to the burgeoning economy by strikes, low-level dissidence — as in Miss Lee's case — and violent clashes would eventually require the government to listen to their demands.

By 1987, the time of the Great Worker Struggle, legally striking was virtually impossible, with many unions being supervised and run by the state at the national-level.[12] Despite their illegality, autonomous, non-government unions became a significant force in the movement.[13] The now much larger middle class and average citizens were also a formidable presence during the strikes of 1987, where they traditionally had not been present in previous protest movements. Approximately 6 million Koreans participated in protest activities in 1987, placing immense pressure on the Chun Doo-hwan regime to democratize, which led to the establishment of the Sixth Republic — the current system of government in South Korea.[14] While it can be challenging to prove that the disruptive and militant demonstrations by lower-class workers and students caused the required pressure on the government to democratize, the combination of these two groups undoubtedly had an immense influence on protest movements that led to the 1987 democratic transition.[15] Should student groups and other *chaeya* not have coopted, cooperated, or at least sympathized with the labor movement, the government may not have had as much difficulty suppressing the democratization movement after the Gwangju Uprising.

Workers had explicit, concrete wants from the government, such as freedom to unionize, better pay, better working conditions, weekends, and shorter working hours. Their targets were mainly their employers, not the government. Perhaps because the government was so willing to support enterprises through policy and repression of labor organizing, students who infiltrated the labor movement succeeded in injecting the movement with the ultimate goal

of democratization. This phenomenon would suggest not "no bourgeois, no democracy" but rather "no lower-class support, no democracy."[16] Ultimately, the *chaeya* were successful in co-opting the labor movement led by the lower classes for their want to democratize, but did the labor movement truly get what it wanted from organizing with those groups?

Democratization is Done, Now What About Lower Class Laborers' Needs?

Just like a rising tide raises all boats, economic growth improves the living standards of nearly everyone in that state. However, that improvement in living standards as a result of democratization and further embracing globalization has limits for the lower and lower middle classes. South Korea's economy is still heavily dependent on *chaebol* like Samsung, Hyundai, SK Group, and LG. As of 2018, *chaebol* made up around 77% of South Korean GDP, but only 12% of South Korea's jobs were with those same companies.[17] While 88% of other jobs may be with small and medium enterprises that support these *chaebol,* it appears that the gains from globalization coming from democratization are leaving workers outside the *chaebol* economy behind. Because of the makeup of the South Korean economy, wages are a contentious issue with wide-reaching effects, being that small and medium enterprises primarily rely on low-wage workers who work long, often unpredictable hours.[18] For the lower and lower middle classes, the rising tide feels more like a wave, where they are perpetually stuck at the base watching the crest reach ever higher.

Per the *Korea Herald,* in a survey of "3,079 single-person households, 54.1 percent responded they felt hardships or pressure in paying rent and other housing-related expenditures. Of the respondents, 66.8 percent were those in their 20s and 30s."[19] Applying for public housing and assistance remains easier for two-or-more-person households than for single-person households, the latter comprising 31.7% of all households in South Korea as of 2020.[20] Marriage and birth rates are famously falling in South Korea, with many citing the increasing cost of

living and child-rearing, as well as "education costs, scarce jobs and general anxiety about the future [as] other contributing factors."[21] Deposits and additional fees on top of rent can substantially increase the burden on renters, who make up approximately 57.5% of households in Seoul alone.[22] Rising costs, increased competition for fewer high-paying jobs, and wage increases that aren't keeping up with inflation have energized the labor movement. Approximately 600 strikes took place between 2015 and 2019 in South Korea, causing an estimated production loss of $5 billion.[23] Most recently, a December 2022 strike of subway workers and truckers broke out, but the government of recently-elected president Yoon Suk-yeol took an unusual but all-too-familiar step of ordering cement truckers to return to work. President Yoon's pro-business mindset has caused low-wage workers to worry about whether their pay will increase with rising costs.

Can it be said that the democratized state is meeting the lower classes' needs? The fact that the minimum wage has increased substantially in recent years can demonstrate that some needs are being met. On the other hand, rising living costs and long working hours are outpacing the benefit of those wage increases, causing large-scale societal issues like plummeting birth rates. The situation in South Korea is entering new but familiar territory where the wants and needs of lower classes and laborers are being unmet, but now there is a democracy in place that enables laborers to elect representatives. Democracy is not the problem for the labor movement; rather, it is the inability or unwillingness of that democracy to meet the demands of the lowest socioeconomic classes in lieu of the demands of capitalism and globalization.

When situations feel out of control or overwhelming, people want a leader who will steer them through difficult times and who makes promises that their constituents' lives will improve under their regime. Researchers from London Business School have found that "uncertainty and competitive threats in one's environment" increase people's preference for dominant leaders rather than admired or respected candidates.[24] To people in lower socioeconomic classes, economic uncertainty has clear remedies: increase wages, lower prices, and ensure stability and prosperity for progeny. Regardless of whether these goals are theoretically possible at the same time, an apparently strong, often populist leader can use these woes to stir public support for election campaigns, social movements, or other displays of discontent. Similar to how students used the labor movement to support their desire for democratization, an authoritarian-minded candidate or politician could take hold in today's labor movement if they use the right words and take the right strategic actions. These situations are not exclusive to South Korea, as other developed countries are facing major democratic crises brought about by the same feelings of economic uncertainty. Lower classes anywhere could come to support some form of democratic backsliding — even if they were not aware of it — if the movement was couched in their language and in accordance with their goals. Not only is lower-class support thus necessary for the process of democratization — as seen through the South Korean case — but it is also necessary if democratic backsliding were to take hold: no lower-class support, no support for governmental change.

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Welfare state or welfare capitalism?

Déliana Renou

On the Western convergence approach to European post-communist transitions

There is no real consensus on a clear definition of what welfare entails. Some refer to the welfare state, others to welfare regimes, in an attempt to link the welfare provision to the larger economic and institutional framework. Some

also refer to welfare capitalism, thus excluding non-capitalist societies from the analysis. In this paper, welfare *state* is to be understood as Wilensky[1] and Titmuss[2] understood social policy: "as a government obligation to ensure a decent

standard of living for its citizens, given as a social right through such channels as social security, social services, the labor market, housing policy, education and health care."[3]

Welfare states have been extensively studied in comparative social policy, but research has mainly focused on OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries. As with many other countries, Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries are either left out of the analysis or considered in a *transitional stage* as of 1990, moving toward one of the existing Western welfare state categories. This *transitional stage* used to describe CEE welfare regimes in the 90s implies that the "development" of welfare states is based on Western norms (i.e. capitalist society and free-market economies, democracy) rather than on pure welfare provisions level. This paper will argue that this Western convergence theory approach of social policy analysis has ongoing consequences on post-communist countries' welfare systems. Indeed, the path-dependency perspective expects communist legacies to impose on the CEE countries a distinct path of development by Western European countries.[4] In contrast, the policy-diffusion perspective contends that the "transfer of ideas, knowledge and other resources [will] guide these countries' developments in the direction of one of the well-known welfare regimes."[5] We will first put into perspective two well-known welfare state typologies to discuss whether communist countries can be understood as welfare states before analyzing some of the effects that such a Western and market-economy-centered approach can have on the transition of post-communist CEE welfare regimes.

It is worth noting, that this Western economically liberal approach to social policy was also very popular among some CEE political elites at the time of transition. The post-communist transition was of course driven by both internal and external political forces. We will not elaborate on the internal forces in this paper,[6] but it is very clear that the topic of the communist legacy in social policy was (and still is) highly political in CEE countries.

Typologies of "welfare states" or of "welfare capitalisms"

The concept of the welfare state has, for a long time, referred mainly to affluent capitalist democracies.[7] A relevant example of this understanding of the welfare state as *welfare capitalism* can be found in Esping-Andersen's work, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. In it, he writes that welfare states aim to allow "modern capitalist enterprise to become a substitute for the unpleasantly communistic flavor of social insurance."[8] Esping-Andersen's famous typology sorts capitalist welfare regimes not according to the amount of money spent on social programs, but rather on the effect that the welfare regime has on social stratification and the decommodification it enables. In their 1999 paper, Goodin and al. consider a welfare regime a way not only to organize the "transfer sector, represented by the social welfare policy, but also the productive sector of the capitalist economy."[9] Non-capitalist societies, they follow, are thus left out of the discussion. Titmuss and Wilensky[10] are some out of few who included communist countries in their analysis. Titmuss' classification[11] develops three welfare state types, in which he categorizes both capitalist and non-capitalist societies. Soviet Russia is thus taken into account in his typology. This typology was, however, developed in the 1970s, a period when Western academics had a different attitude towards communist States than in the 1990s. Moreover, Soviet Russia's welfare state changed throughout its history. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in the 1970s, some welfare states typologies did not exclude non-capitalist regimes.

Moreover, the question of whether a welfare state can occur in a non-democratic regime is a legitimate one. When for most social policy researchers, welfare states go hand in hand not only with capitalism but also with democratic institutions, Titmuss and Wilensky argue that "it does not matter what kind of society it is, whether pluralist or totalitarian, the welfare state is seen as a prime source of consensus in any society."[12]

According to this definition, Soviet countries can be considered welfare states. In fact, the Soviet Union's constitution states that social security was granted to each person as a social right by the state.[13] If the criteria for the existence of a welfare state is the search for an equal share of resources and universal basic social protection, rather than the existence of either a market-based economy or a democracy, communist welfare regimes can be considered as such. In terms of the universality of social provisions and of the state's social expenditure as a proportion of the GDP, the communist welfare state not only existed, but was to some extent quite expansive. As described by Deacon, the communist "social-welfare contract [...] consisted of the provision of highly subsidized prices on food, housing, transport and basic necessities, guaranteed employment, adequate health and education provision and small differentials between the wages of workers, professionals and managers."[14,][15] This welfare system — if considered as such — was characterized by full employment for both men and women but relatively low labor mobility.[16] Solidarity and equality were fundamental values of communist welfare regimes. The level of protection, however, was based on a relatively low quality of life.

Post-communist CEE welfare regimes: a new type of welfare states or transitioning welfare states, tending toward existing Western typologies?

Despite these characteristics that led us to understand communist societies as welfare states, most comparative social policy studies assumed that welfare provision is incompatible with Soviet states. This incompatibility between non-capitalist societies and the existence of welfare provision is reflected in the 1990s structural reforms rationale in CEE countries. Western influence in the region has primarily taken a policy diffusion path rather than a path-dependency. This latter direction would have acknowledged the specificity of these welfare regimes in light of their decade of communist experience.

In 1993, Deacon suggested that the differences between Western and Eastern countries were due to the transition process — thus not considering the decades of profoundly different histories between these two parts of Europe. He predicted that "in a few years' time we will be able to look back and characterize the social policy of these countries in terms that reflect Esping-Andersen's threefold typology."[17] According to Fenger's take[18] on Esping-Anderson's 1996 book,[19] he too believed that the difference between the three welfare types and that CEE countries were only of a transitional nature. In the same vein, Ferge[20] stated that the Eastern European welfare system will fit in the so-called 'European model' once CEE governments acquire the goodwill of "foreign capital and supranational agencies to manage their financial problems."[21] According to this perception, there is no reason for post-communist CEE countries to constitute a new type of welfare state — the path-dependency approach is not only excluded but not even considered.

This perception of CEE welfare systems as an 'incomplete' or 'immature' version of the corporatist model implies some categorization of welfare states' 'development'. As noted by Kleinman, "the clear implication is that over time and with continuing economic development, these welfare states will become full members of the western corporatist 'family'."[22] The profoundly different historical legacies and demographic situations are completely left out of the analysis. Some welfare state theorists[23] have thus applied western welfare regime models to CEE countries, such as the residual welfare model (in consequences of the IMF and World Bank influences) or the conservative corporatist one (model supposedly promoted by the EU to allow convergence and thus greater EU enlargement).

Western policy diffusion approach to the post-communist transition in CEE countries

There are numerous ways to analyze the role of communist legacy in the transition. In terms of external forces, it is fair to say that western ideology saw market economy and democracy going hand in hand, thus excluding any communist legacy in the building of

new democratic regimes in CEE countries. The Western approach in this region was a *policy diffusion* one, considering that the post-communist CEE countries needed to implement structural reforms to *transition* to a market-economy democracy and to apply a *Western type of welfare model.*

Within the logic of expanding the Washington Consensus toward Central and Eastern Europe, the IMF and the World Bank were involved in these structural reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. Governmental budget pressure, along with the conditions laid down for receiving IMF and World Bank funds "encouraged the residualist welfare policy of a liberal state."[24] Through their economic relations with nations needing support, these organizations used their financial levers to advocate for social policy change.[25] In the CEE countries, this led to a shift toward residual social policy, "in which the state is supposed to concentrate on targeting resources on the neediest people and leave to the market the provision of private pensions to raise people from subsistence to sufficiency and beyond."[26]

In the early years of the transition, most CEE countries experienced an economic crisis, including inflation and unemployment, unlike anything experienced under the communist period, ultimately creating an urgent need for new forms of social protection. The shock therapy implemented to liberalize the economy led to a massive decline in employment "that became as great as in Western Europe but without a social security system oriented to deal with fluctuating employment and unemployment."[27] Reforms broke with old shared social values: guaranteed employment, enterprise-based social benefits through direct provision of goods and services, and social protection via subsidized prices.[28] Public expenditures as a percentage of GDP decreased after 1990 — Bulgaria's government expenditure, for example, fell from 66% of GDP in 1990 to 47% in 1996.[29] One of the reasons for this public expenditure drop is the removal of subsidies such as housing subsidies. However, interestingly, social expenditures as a percentage

of the total public expenditure increased, which does not mean that it increased in real terms, considering the drastic decrease in general public expenditure. This increase is partly due to the introduction of previously nonexistent unemployment benefits.[30] But if initially rather generous, as unemployment rose during the 90s, CEE governments were subject to more pressure from the IMF and the World Bank to tighten conditions of entitlement. This led to a residual unemployment benefit by the mid-90s in most CEE countries, where only a small share of unemployed people were receiving small unemployment benefits. Consistent with a globalized economic rationale, CEE countries partly privatized their pension system as well as their health care insurance. The overall logic was to switch to a *means-tested* allocation of benefits.

If the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on social policy in transitional countries is widely acknowledged in numerous studies,[31] the influence of "Europeanisation" is less consensual. However, it can be argued that the EU integration process undertook a policy diffusion approach. The adoption of *acquis communautaire* and accession criteria exist to "incorporate the accumulated results of the European integration process, of which the candidate countries [CEE countries] have not been part."[32] Through the European accession, "new members will be re-created as states, committed to processes of policy making and policy outcomes that in many instances bear little or no relation to their domestic policy-making and prior policy decisions."[33] On the ground of 'homogenizing' European social policy, the EU pressured for the implementation of reforms that were very much inconsistent with the historically and politically-specific context of CEE countries.

To respond to the transitional argument, Fenger[34] has argued that if post-communist CEE welfare regimes were to *converge* toward Western European typologies, these differences would have likely vanished after 15 years of transition in 2005 (and 30 years in 2020). He further states that "if these differences still exist, this might lead to the abandonment of the idea of transitional

stage."[35] To estimate if these differences still exist, he developed a new welfare state typology that includes post-communist countries. His hierarchical cluster analysis shows that "the Eastern European welfare states can be clearly distinguished from the traditional European welfare state."[36] They generally have lower indicators of health and social wellness, a significantly lower level of trust and a higher female participation than in Western types. But these Central and Eastern European welfare regimes also differ from one another. Fenger theorizes three post-communist types, which are not homogeneous: 1) the former-USSR type (Russia, Belarus and Baltic countries), which shares common trends with the conservative-corporatist type (medium government expenditure, relying on social contribution rather than taxes, high level of unemployment), 2) the post-communist European type (Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and Czech Republic), which have similar trends as the former-USSR type with lower inflation and higher social well-being, and 3) the developing welfare states type (Romania, Moldova and Georgia), which is generally behind in all indicators (low life expectancy, low level of trust, high inflation, lower government expenditure in every social field).

We will close this paper on this innovative typology that Fenger developed, making the argument for the recognition of post-communist diversity. This paper argues that the lack of consideration of the communist and then of the post-communist welfare states by Western comparative social policy theorists led to the spread of a hierarchical modernization and development approach to social policy. The application of ill-adapted economically liberal constraints led CEE's welfare regimes to become residual and means-tested when, historically, it was considered universal. Through the *acquis communautaires* and the conditionality to receive funds, the EU and the IMF paved the way for changes in CEE's welfare regimes to be driven by a *policy diffusion approach* toward welfare capitalism, rather than a *path dependency one* that would have acknowledged their social policy history.

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Insurgencies or Gangs: An Analysis of Service Provision by Criminal Organizations

Olivia Bauer

Background

In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, criminal organizations provided humanitarian aid to those in need. Service provision by criminal organizations has important implications for state sovereignty, democracy, and U.S. national security. Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) that aim to overthrow the state or play an active role in politics, such as insurgencies or terrorist organizations, provide services to citizens to obtain their loyalty or votes, gain legitimacy, and/or weaken the state by undermining their authority.[1] When citizens are no longer relying on the state for services, they will be less likely to recognize state authority, and the state's democratic processes will lose legitimacy. An armed group without political aspirations, like a criminal organization with financial motivation, providing services to the public is unexpected.

Criminal organizations must gain favor with communities because these organizations have a weaker ideological basis. They usually do not directly claim to address the social or political grievances of the community, and their activities bring violence, so the communities where criminal organizations operate are more likely to cooperate with state law enforcement than the communities where political NSAGs operate.[2] Criminal organizations must provide an incentive for these communities to tolerate their presence. Powerful organizations must project an image as a charitable provider to maintain control, similarly to dictators who engage in overt, visible benevolent acts to justify their rule

and placate their people.[3]

Communal compliance contributes economically to their activities not only because it prevents resistance, but also because they gain access to a labor pool and other forms of support. If a criminal organization needs human capital to carry out its business, it will likely provide more services to the community.[4] Offering employment in places where unemployment is high is an effective recruitment tactic, but the danger associated with criminal activity provides a strong incentive for members to defect, necessitating further service provision to the community to maintain their labor pool.[5]

Theory and Hypotheses

As established in the previous section, criminal organizations are motivated by their own interests, principally economic gain.[6] Social services are provided by criminal organizations to prevent communal resistance, gain popular support, and recruit labor. It is expected that where (A) fewer state services are provided and (B) higher rates of unemployment are experienced, criminal organizations will provide more services.

Hypothesis A explores the oppositional relationship between service providers. Existing literature establishes that criminal organizations govern where the presence of the state is weak.[7] It has been recorded that where there are fewer state services, criminal organizations have more influence.[8] The provider gains power over the recipient by providing services to those who lack access to these services.[9] To test hypothesis A, the availability and usage of public health care will be measured.

However, some evidence suggests that Hypothesis A not may illustrate the full picture. Hypothesis B investigates the idea that illegal governance results from deep social and structural issues. Studies have shown that increasing government services does not necessarily disrupt criminal services.[10] This could be because of structural issues, such as people in areas where criminal organizations operate, especially men, having worse labor

market experiences.[11] Additionally, the social circumstances associated with areas experiencing criminal governance include a lack of trust in state institutions and less affluent or more deprived communities.[12] Alternatively, citizens may continue to accept criminal services because they often offer better services than the state.[13] Structural problems such as widespread unemployment make criminal groups' offer of employment to unemployed or underemployed people significant. To test hypothesis B, this paper will measure unemployment rates.

A void in government service provision and high unemployment rates are expected to be necessary but insufficient conditions to explain service provision by criminal organizations. Hypothesis C will test this possibility. To test these theories, this paper will conduct a two-case comparison on the service provision of Cosa Nostra in Sicily from 1980 to 2000 and La Familia Michoacána/The Knights Templar (LFM/TKT) in Michoacán, Mexico, from 2000 to 2020.

Cosa Nostra in Sicily, 1980-2000

Cosa Nostra formally emerged in the nineteenth century out of groups formed to protect the residents of Sicily from foreign invaders who ruled the island for centuries.[14] These groups extorted money from citizens in exchange for protection. In 1861, Sicily became a province after Italian unification, and Cosa Nostra collaborated with the federal government to maintain order.[15] Cosa Nostra's power peaked in 1980 as a result of their heavy investment in public works projects.[16]

Cosa Nostra exemplifies the pitfalls of governing without providing genuine public services. After World War II, Cosa Nostra became highly invested in public works projects, though most had no benefit for the community.[17] Investments were often driven by profit incentives for Cosa Nostra. Such projects included roads to nowhere, factories that never produced products, and other projects simply left unfinished.[18] As a result of government corruption, public works projects for the maintenance of streets, sewers, water, and public lighting were awarded to the same

private company controlled by Cosa Nostra for thirty-five years.[19] In Palermo in 1993, "garbage and trash lined the streets of the city. Natural gas for cooking and heating was available only intermittently, and public buses rarely ran on time. The municipality rationed water during the day."[20] They also owned most schools during this era, creating larger structural issues due to worse educational outcomes.[21] Massive amounts of taxes were wasted on public works companies owned by Cosa Nostra that did not provide. In Sicily, there was a dearth of quality services from both the state and the criminal government.

Figure 1: Number of Citizens per General Public Health Institute, 1980-2000

Annuario Statistico Italiano from 1980 to 2000

The data in Figure 1 shows that citizens in Sicily and Italy had approximately the same access to public medical facilities during this period. Therefore, this data does not support hypothesis A. However, the media analysis of Cosa Nostra's service provision showed that the state failed to provide adequate water, power, waste disposal, and infrastructure maintenance services due to Cosa Nostra's infiltration, giving credence to hypothesis A.

Figure 2: Unemployment in Sicily and Italy, 1980-2000

Annuario Statistico Italiano from 1980 to 2000

The Sicilian unemployment rate was extremely high, especially after 1985. Schools in Palermo had dropout rates as high as 40% in poor, mafia-controlled neighborhoods.[22] Without other opportunities, many young Sicilians

opted to join Cosa Nostra. The combined effect of high levels of unemployment and low levels of effective state services supports hypothesis C. During the late twentieth century, Cosa Nostra had a hold on the provision of state-funded services and employment opportunities in Sicily, cementing their domination over governance in Sicily.

La Familia Michoacána (LFM)/The Knights Templar in Michoacán (TKT), 2000-2020

When La Familia Michoacána formed in the 1980s, its purpose was to counter criminal organizations as a vigilante group protecting the poor and creating social order.[23] As the group gained repute and power as an effective purveyor of retribution, it became a criminal organization trafficking drugs, especially methamphetamines.[24] In 2006, LFM gained control of the state of Michoacán on the Pacific coast. In 2010, the group splintered and several founding members formed Los Caballeros Templarios, or The Knights Templar. TKT retained control of Michoacán for much of the 2010s, but their power deteriorated after their leader, Servando "La Tuta" Gómez, was arrested in 2015.[25]

When LFM came to power in 2006, they hung posters claiming that "they were going to save the people of Michoacán from synthetic drugs and that they were not going to allow other groups from outside to poison the youth."[26] Their media campaigns were effective in allowing the group to enjoy great social loyalty in some communities.[27] Reporter Carlos Loret de Mola wrote in 2013 that "Michoacán functions as if it were an independent country whose owner and ruler is… the criminal organization 'Los Caballeros Templarios'."

Mil Cumbres, a mountainous region in Michoacán, reportedly has significant criminal investment.[28] Edgardo Buscaglia, a professor of Law and Economics from the Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico and an expert on drug trafficking issues, said of the region, "one travels through Michoacán and you will find schools with satellite dishes, regions with first-world irrigation systems that look like Swiss towns, with cemented drainage systems, they look like Austrian towns in some cases

and were not built by the State."[29] There are also reports that LFM ran rehabilitation centers used to recruit and indoctrinate members.[30] Members were forbidden to drink or do drugs. Advancement within the LFM hierarchy allegedly "depends as much on regular attendance at prayer meetings as on target practice."[31] One former rehabilitation pastor who was arrested, José Alberto López Barrón, recounted in 2009 a set of laws that LFM enforced in their territory, including "respecting people, not stealing, not raping, and the right to a flat and rents."[32] Another source reported that "the organization provides loans to agricultural companies, drainage infrastructure, canals and irrigation technology, schools, churches, and even protection for some sections of the population," including sexual violence against women.[33]

Nocupétaro and Tuzantla) had almost no state security forces after the majority of the officers "quit due to threats and pressure from criminal groups," supporting hypothesis A.[34]

Figure 4: Unemployment Rates of Michoacán and Mexico, 2005-2020

Anuario Estadístico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos from 2000 to 2020

Figure 3: Rate of Public Health Service Usage

Anuario Estadístico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos from 2000 to 2020

Figure 5: Underemployment Rates in Michoacán and Mexico, 2005-2020

Anuario Estadístico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos from 2000 to 2020

LFM took over Michoacán in 2006 and splintered in 2010, but this data is missing for the years after 2006. The available data shows that before LFM seized the state, citizens of Michoacán used public health services at a much higher rate than the average Mexican. More than 80% of citizens used public health services in Michoacán every year with available data. It is uncertain whether there is a significant lack of state services in Michoacán after 2006 because the data may not be accurate given that the Mexican state did not have control over this territory for most of this period. These public health services could also have been distributed by LFM/TKT, and the data does not show the quality of the services. Additionally, in December 2011, five cities in Michoacán (Carácuaro, Tancítaro, Tiquicheo,

The unemployment and underemployment rates in Michoacán were predominantly lower than the Mexican unemployment rate between 2006 and 2014, as noted in Figures 4 and 5. Therefore, hypotheses B and C are not supported.

Discussion

The explanation for criminal service provision is layered and unique to the context of each organization. In Sicily, people experienced higher unemployment rates and other structural issues like high dropout rates combined with a void of state service provision. This case supports hypothesis C. However, Cosa Nostra seems to have been more driven by the revenue from service provision rather than the social benefits. At the turn of the twenty-

first century, the influence and power of Cosa Nostra deteriorated because of massive popular resistance and betrayal of the Omertà code of silence, a wide-spread norm of noncooperation with authorities.[35] Sicilians organized a group called *Addiopizzo,* meaning "Goodbye *pizzo* (the name of the "protection" tax)" and began to refuse to pay the *pizzo* to Cosa Nostra in 2004. The services provided by Cosa Nostra were of low quality, employment opportunities were limited, and violence was endemic, leading to the civil rebellion and cooperation with Italian law enforcement. If Cosa Nostra had provided higher-quality services and prioritized the needs of the people who lived where they operated, they might not have fallen from power.

The case of La Familia Michoacána/The Knights Templar presents a strikingly different case. The data on public health care service usage shows that most Michoacánes used state medical services. Still, the data do not indicate the quality of the services, the quantity of services, or if LFM/TKT co-opted these services. The higher rates of public health service usage could also indicate that there are higher rates of private health service usage outside of Michoacán. Additionally, Michoacán has a lower unemployment and underemployment rate than Mexico. The data's validity may be questionable because of the criminal control of the state. However, it is possible that the data is accurate and LFM/TKT invested heavily in social service provision because winning Michoacánes over from the Mexican government required it. Other explanations for the services could be dedication to their Catholic faith and/or the group's origin as a vigilante group with its roots in public protection and service. The data from the *Anuarios Estadísticos de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos* does not demonstrate support for hypothesis A or B, but the media analysis shows that LFM/TKT provided superior services where the state services were lacking, supporting hypothesis A.

Conclusion

Both cases show that defeating highly developed and powerful criminal organizations requires winning the "hearts and minds" of the citizens living where they operate. In Sicily, the Italian government successfully overthrew Cosa Nostra because they gained the support of Sicilians. Conversely, the Mexican state cracked down on cartels violently and without distinction, alienating the local populations. State crackdowns are less likely to succeed when they are not strategically targeted at violent criminal organizations.[36] Lessing (2012) recommends a "conditional approach" in which violent repression is used to respond only to cartels' use of violence. Similarly, based on their research on the *favelas* in Rio de Janeiro, Magaloni, Franco-Vivanco, and Melo (2020) purport that state intervention is more effective when criminal governance is violent than when it is "benign", in which case intervention can actually escalate further violence.[37] These cases also show the potential for criminal organizations to become political over time due to their increased power through providing services and governance.

Service provision by criminal organizations has important implications for state sovereignty and democracy. Rampant violence in which criminal organizations blatantly attack the police and military, as well as citizens who report them to authorities, threatens the state's monopoly on violence.[38] Additionally, the functioning of hybrid governance by non-state actors challenges the legitimacy of the state's political authority.[39] While service provision by non-state actors is often essential, this provision has ramifications for the relationships between citizens and states and for the equity of access to social services and protection.[40] These consequences affect democratic governance and experiences of citizenship.[41] Local-level democracy in particular is severely hindered by criminal hybrid governance schemes.[42] By attempting to protect their illegal enterprises from interference, organized crime unintentionally challenges the sovereignty and democratic nature of states.[43]

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Program Highlights

During the 2021-2022 academic year, the Democracy & Governance program welcomed our 17th class of incoming students in the Fall of 2022: **Milan Bailey, Adnan Basheer, Charlene Batlle, Leesa Danzek, Rafael de Osma, Sohila Hassan, Tyler Heffern, Collin Hulling, Shakira Jackson, Opal Malai, Ruwaidah Maudarbux, Louis Mignot Bonnefous, Nathan Posner,** and **Katja Volz**. We also welcomed new Assistant Director, **Bryson Daniels**.

On September 29th, 2022 graduate students from the Democracy & Governance program organized the inaugural Georgetown Parlor event on **Who Will Rule the 21st Century**? Graduate students from various disciplines and diverse backgrounds rarely have opportunities to engage peers from different departments in an open academic setting, thus **Georgetown Parlor** brought students together for a two-hour, student-led, open conversation on contemporary issues every month during the 2022-2023 academic year. Special thanks to **Leesa Danzek**, **Yusuf Can** and **Evan Mann** for helping organize this set of events.

On October 27th, we held our annual career panel and reception. Panel members discussed the evolution of the fields of democracy, governance, and development, and how they structured their own studies and professional careers. The panel featured **Eric Bjornlund**, a member of the advisory board of Georgetown University's M.A. Program in Democracy and Governance, and co-founder, President and CEO of Democracy International; **Katie LaRoque**, the Deputy Director for Policy and Advocacy at Freedom House, and **Kate Krueger**, Learning, Evidence, and Impact Advisor at Pact.

On November 11th, our program collaborated with the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS) to host a talk by Dr. **Hesham Sallam**, on his book, *Classless Politics: Islamist Movements, the Left, and Authoritarian Legacies in Egypt* (Columbia University Press). A cutting-edge study, his book probes the relationship between neoliberal economics and Islamist politics in Egypt that sheds new light on the worldwide trend of "more identity, less class."

On November 18th, we organized a virtual D&G Career Panel with five leaders of major democracy organizations. Panel members will discuss the focus of their organization, the knowledge and skills their organization seeks in employees, and areas of growth. Panelists included **Brian Joseph**, Vice President for Programs at the National Endowment for Democracy, **Rudy Porter**, Europe and Central Asia Regional Program Director, Solidarity Center, **Abdulwahab Alkebsi**, Managing Director for Programs at the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), **Stephanie Rust**, Chief Programs Officer at the National Democratic Institute, and **Scott Mastic**, IRI's Vice President for Programs.

On November 29th, we hosted a virtual discussion of the book: *100% Democracy: The Case for Universal Voting*. Authors **E.J. Dionne** and **Miles Rapoport** discussed their book in which they put forward the case for universal civic duty voting, that is 100% voter participation in the election. Under their proposal, voters will be required to participate in voting by either casting valid ballots, or blank or spoiled ballots if there is no candidate they feel compelled to support. The event was organized and moderated by professor and Senior Fellow Jeff Fischer.

On December 12th, the fall 2022 International Electoral Policy and Practice course hosted a webinar on Electoral Violence in the U.S. Mid-Term Elections (2022). Students **Milan Bailey, Rafael de Osma, Tyler Heffern, Evan McKee,** and **Katja Volz** – led by Professor **Jeff Fischer** – examined incidents of intimidation, and violence during the pre-election, Election Day, and post-election phases of the mid-term elections. Throughout the duration of the project, these examinations shifted focus from evaluating and

recording violence to evaluating the mitigation tactics used to avoid electoral violence.

On March 14th, 2023, our program collaborated with the M.A. in Conflict Resolution to host the V-Dem Institute's Professor **Staffan I. Lindberg** and Dr. **Evie Papada** for a discussion about the latest trends for democracy and autocracy in the world and across regions, based on this year's Democracy Report titled *Defiance in the Face of Autocratization.*

On March 16th, as part of the Democracy & Governance program speaker series "Trending… In Elections", Professor **Jeff Fischer** hosted a panel discussion on Disinformation & Election Technology. The panel highlighted the experiences of four technology companies and the kinds of disinformation they've experienced, technologies targeted, their support for election officials, and preparations for new rounds of disinformation in the 2024 election cycle. This webinar featured: **Jeff Fischer**, Senior Fellow of the Democracy and Governance program; **Lori Augino,** Vice President of Government Relations at Democracy Live; **Samuel Derheimer**, Director of Government Affairs at Hart InterCivic; **Dan Murphy**, Engagement Director at Smartmatic Company; and **Chris Waschin**, Senior Vice President and Chief Information Security Officer at Election Systems & Software.

On March 27th, Democracy and Governance, along with *Democracy and Society,* for the first time ever participated as Global Democracy Coalition Partners in Democracy Day through the virtual panel titled: *The Next Generation of Democracy Practitioners and Academics: Perspectives from Young Leaders and Up-and-Comers in the Field.* DG students **Opal Malai, Kion Bordbar, Yusuf Can, Adnan Basheer**, and moderator **Leesa Danzek**, discussed student perspectives on the future of democracy assistance, coming into the profession under populist threats to democracy, and the constantly developing intersection between democracy and digital evolution.

On April 12th, our Center for Democracy and Civil Society (CDACS) organized the *Democracy*

and Governance Student Research Symposium. The event was an opportunity for MA students from the DMV area universities who are focused on democracy and governance to present their independent research/projects, gain practical experience, connect with other young people in the field, and make career connections with established professionals looking for exciting new ideas and innovations. Special thanks to **Abby Carlson** for helping to organize this event.

On April 17th, our program organized a *virtual Alumni Talk* featuring **Soo Koo** '12 Stakeholder Engagement Officer, US Department of State, **Joshua Allen** '22, Hilary Rodham Clinton Fellow and **Liza Prendergast** '12, Vice President for Strategy & Technical Leadership. Special thanks to **Bryson Daniels** and **Abby Carlson** for helping organize this event.

On April 24th, Director of the Democracy and Governance Program, Dr. **Elton Skendaj**, moderated an interview with former President of Slovenia, **Borut Pahor**, co-hosted with the Georgetown University Lecture Fund. Their discussion covered Russia's War in Ukraine and its implications for security in the Western Balkans and greater Europe.

On April 25th, program organized a panel on the recent elections in Nigeria, titled: **Elections and the Future of Nigerian Democracy**. The panelists included **Amaka Anku**, Eurasia Group Practice Head, SFS Adjunct Professor; **Julia Brothers**, National Democratic Institute Senior Advisor for Elections Programs; and **Ferdinand Duru**, Georgetown PhD student, Dept. of Linguistics. Special thanks to **Leesa Danzek** for moderating and helping organize this event.

On May 3rd, Program Director **Elton Skendaj** participated in a Stories of Democracy Workshop at International Idea headquarters in Stockholm, Sweden, to discuss the partnership between the Democracy & Governance program and International Idea. Special thanks to professor **Jeff Fischer** for spearheading the Stories of Democracy project.

On June 11-18th, the Democracy & Governance

program at Georgetown University participated in the first **Bulgaria Exchange**, organized with the Center for Information, Democracy, and Citizenship (CIDC) at the American University in Bulgaria (AUBG). The aim of this week-long exchange is to promote a discussion on the current challenges to democratic governments by looking at Bulgaria, a democracy under stress. Bulgaria, a country that transitioned from its communist past to a democratic state, is an interesting case study in part for its EU and NATO membership, aspiration to join the eurozone and Schengen, history of clientelistic networks among political and economic elites, and significant pro-Russian elements within the public.

This year, we also said farewell to 14 impressive graduates of the MA program in Democracy and Governance: **Michael Angeloni, Ian Archbold, Kion Bordbar, Yusuf Can, Abigail Carlson, Lindsey Levy, Evan Mann, Owen Myers, Alexandra Orellana, Maryam Rayed, Sammy Saleh, Kenza Sandi, Molly Sweet,** and **James Venslauskas** We also said farewell to Program Coordinator **Rick Ferreira** as he embarks on new endeavors.

A special thanks to our staff:

Program Director
Dr. Elton Skendaj

Assistant Director
Bryson Daniels

Editors
Yusuf Can
Evan Mann

Assistant Editors
Charlene Batlle
Leesa Danzek